The Determinants of Loan Loss Provisions in Islamic Banking by Al-Khayat, Laith
Al-Khayat, Laith (2013) The Determinants of Loan Loss 
Provisions in Islamic Banking. [Dissertation (University 
of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26449/1/Full_Dissertation_Complete_FINAL.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Nottingham 
The Determinants of Loan Loss Provisions in Islamic Banking 
Laith Al-Khayat 
MSc Finance and Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Determinants of Loan Loss Provisions in Islamic Banking 
by 
Laith Al-Khayat 
2013 
A Dissertation presented in part consideration for the degree of MSc Finance and 
Investment. 
  
 Abstract 
Only recently have regulators and academics started to pay special attention to 
alternative methods of banking. Islamic banks offer a unique environment 
considering they are fundamentally different due to the fact they follow Shariah law. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the key determinants behind loan loss 
provisions in the Islamic banking industry. The study then compares the results to 
the determinants of conventional banks and explores the reasons behind these 
underlying differences in provisioning behaviour. This study uses a sample of 57 
Islamic banks, operating in 15 countries over the period of 2002-2012. It utilises 
two main models: an Ordinary Least Squares regression model and a dynamic 
Generalised Method of Moments Arellano-Bond estimator. The main determinants 
are found to be tier 1 capital, non-performing loans and size. The results confirm 
that Islamic banks are prudent and not procyclical. They also confirm that the banks 
do not income-smooth except when they suffer negative earnings, acting as a 
countercyclical tool. These findings reveal that Islamic banksÕ provisioning behaviour 
is very different to conventional banks across the world allowing them to avoid 
magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on their income and capital. 
Keywords: Islamic banks, bank regulation, loan loss provisions, income-smoothing, 
procyclical, dynamic, prudent, Basel  
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1. Introduction 
The most recent financial crisis has brought about renewed attention and 
appreciation of alternative ways of banking, which are less short term and profit 
driven. Islamic banking is a prominent alternative system of financial intermediation 
that largely avoided the unrest. 
Loan loss provisions are a relatively large accrual for banks and therefore have a 
Òsignificant impact on banksÕ earnings and regulatory capitalÓ (Ahmed, Takeda and 
Thomas, 1999). In theory, the purpose of loan loss provisions is to adjust banksÕ 
loan loss reserves to reflect both past and expected future losses on their loan 
portfolios. In practice however, managers can use them as a tool for various other 
purposes, such as income-smoothing and signalling private information about 
future prospects. 
Many studies have investigated loan loss provisions for conventional commercial 
banks; however, there remains a large gap with regards to research on Islamic 
banking loan loss provisions and the theoretical and empirical explanations behind 
the sectorÕs attitude towards loan loss provisions. More academic attention is 
certainly worthwhile to build on previous work by various respected researchers 
such as Taktak et al (2010), Farook et al (2010) and Misman and Ahmad (2011). 
This paperÕs methodology and time period covered is unique in Islamic banking loan 
loss provision research, adding significant value to the understanding of Islamic 
banks amongst the academic community.  This is especially true considering there 
are currently more than Ò300 Islamic financial institutions spread over 51 countriesÓ 
(Sol, 2007) and bearing in mind Islamic bankingÕs exceptional growth rate of an 
average 20% in the 18 months leading to March 2012, compared to 9% for 
conventional banks in the Middle East region (Hall, 2012) and 5.5% for the top 
1000 banks worldwide (Capgemini, 2012). According to Ernst and Young (2012), 
Islamic banking assets are expected to Ògrow beyond the milestone of $2 trillion by 
2014Ó. This phenomenal growth and the fact the segment is relatively new, seeing 
it was first introduced to the middle east just over forty years ago, justifies doing 
further research into the Islamic banking industry to better understand how they 
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handle their loan loss provisions and if they handle it in a different way to 
conventional, non-Islamic banks.  
The sectorÕs reach and product offerings, such as its expansion into Europe and the 
offering of Shariah compliant bonds known as Sukuks, have widened considerably 
since the inception of Islamic banking. Islamic banks are heavily concentrated in 
the Middle East and South-East Asia. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, has 
transformed its entire banking system to be Shariah compliant (Rokh, 2008).  
Islamic banking is based on the Islamic principles, generally referred to as Shariah. 
Islam is not only concerned with the relationship between man and God, but 
consists of Òa system of beliefs, justice, equity, fairness and moralityÓ (Kettell, 
2010), which underpins the Islamic way of life. These beliefs are used together and 
form the basis for the creation of Islamic financial products, in addition to setting 
the regulation overseeing Islamic banks and their management. 
To accomplish Shariah compliant banking, financial products and services must, in 
particular, prohibit the payment and receipt of interest, known as Riba. Islamic 
banks therefore use Òprofit-and-loss sharing arrangements, purchase and resale of 
goods and services, and the provision of services for feesÓ (Kettell, 2010, p. viii), 
instead of loans. Conventional banks on the other hand are free to use interest in 
designing financial products and therefore do not need to purchase goods and 
services on behalf of their customer; instead, providing them the funds directly. 
The Islamic banking method is seen as more sustainable due to its emphasis on 
purchasing assets rather than relying on debt funding (Taktak et al, 2010). 
Prior studies on loan loss provisions have documented that conventional banks were 
procyclical, postponing provisions when faced with favourable economic conditions 
until negative conditions set in. Islamic banks on the other hand were found to 
practise dynamic provisioning, avoid income-smoothing and were not deemed 
procyclical.  
1.1. Objectives 
The first set of objectives of this dissertation are to: investigate the basic principles 
behind Islamic banking and how the industry is regulated,  synthesise how 
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countries with a large presence in Islamic banking were impacted by the financial 
crisis and investigate how various Islamic countries regulate domestic Islamic 
banks. The second set of objectives are to: critically evaluate, using existing 
literature, how loan loss provisions are applied in both Islamic and conventional 
banking; critically analyse using empirical models the key determinants behind 
Islamic bankingÕs loan loss provisions and subsequently, compare and contrast the 
results to how provisions are influenced in conventional banking. 
1.2. Scope of the dissertation 
This dissertationÕs main goal is to find out how Islamic banks determine and make 
use of loan loss provisions. For example, do they use loan loss provisions to 
income-smooth? Are their loan loss provisions procyclical? Are the bank managers 
incentivised to use them in one way or another, especially with regards to 
discretionary provisions? Its aim is not to research whether Islamic banks are 
indeed ÔIslamicÕ and whether they follow the Muslim holy book, the Quran, nor will 
it seek to identify if Islamic banking is more sustainable or efficient than 
conventional banking. 
1.3. Overview of the methodology 
The empirical analysis will first be conducted by running an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression followed by a separate Arellano-Bond estimation on an 
unbalanced panel, allowing the inclusion of a larger set of banks considering many 
banks are likely to have some missing data points. The data set will include pre-
financial crisis, during the financial crisis and post-crisis years to allow analysis of 
loan loss provisions during various economic and market conditions. OLS estimation 
is rendered inconsistent when including lags of the dependent variable. Arellano-
Bond estimation, a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) difference estimator, on 
the other hand overcomes this problem and achieves consistent results. This 
procedure Òestimates the specific dynamic model in first-differences to solve the 
estimation problem raised by the potential presence of unobserved individual 
effectsÓ. In addition, it gives consistent estimates Òunder the assumption that the 
error term is not serially correlated and the explanatory variables are exogenousÓ 
(Laeven, 2001, Packer and Zhu, 2012). It has been used before for empirical 
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analysis on conventional banking loan loss provisions and appears to have achieved 
reliable results. 
1.4. Structure 
This paper will start by introducing Islamic banking, followed by highlighting key 
regulations that impact both loan loss provisions and managerial behave towards 
provisioning. It will then provide the reader with a world economic overview and 
how notable Islamic countries and their Islamic banks were impacted by the 
financial crisis. Subsequently, the key theories and existing academic work will be 
discussed, followed by an explanation of the data and methodology process that will 
be employed to analyse and establish the key determinants. The quantitative 
models will then be run and key empirical findings will be explained, compared and 
contrasted to both existing academic work on conventional banks and Islamic 
banks. Finally, the results from the findings from the literature review and the 
empirical analysis will be drawn together to conclude, highlighting variables that are 
the key determinants behind loan loss provisioning and the implication of them for 
Islamic banking. 
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2. Islamic Banking and Regulation 
Islamic financial institutions are set apart from the conventional institutions by the 
fact that they have religious links and objectives, based on the Holy QuranÕs 
principles. One of the key fundamental differences is that Islamic banks provide 
products and services to their customers free from interest; instead, Islamic banks 
follow a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) principle. The PLS principle involves the 
borrower of funds forming a partnership with the institution, whereby profits and 
losses out of his/her enterprise are shared at a fixed ratio.  
The largest Islamic banks are located in countries that are part of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). The GCC, in addition to Jordan and 
Malaysia, account for 80% of the Islamic banking industry (IMF Survery, 2010). 
Several factors, such as strong demand for Shariah-compliant products and the 
strengthening of the legal and regulatory framework in these countries, have led to 
strong growth in the sector. Table 1 highlights Islamic bankingÕs growth in assets 
(in percentage) in the GCC in addition to Jordan, Turkey and Malaysia. 
Table 1: Islamic banking asset growth (IMF Survery, 2010) 
 
Market Share 
in 2008 
Islamic 
banking 
asset growth 
rate 
Overall 
banking 
asset growth 
rate 
Period 
Saudi Arabia 35.0 33.4 19.0 2003-2008 
Bahrain 29.9 37.6 9.6 2000-2008 
Kuwait 29.0 28.3 19.0 2002-2008 
UAE 13.5 59.8 38.1 2001-2008 
Qatar 11.5 65.8 38.1 2002-2008 
GCC Average 23.8 45.0 24.8  
Jordan 10.3 20.6 11.2 2001-2008 
Turkey 3.5 41.0 19.0 2001-2008 
Malaysia 17.4 20.0 14.0 2000-2008 
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2.1. Islamic banking regulation 
Islamic bankingÕs greater market discipline cannot eliminate the necessity for 
prudential supervision. Regulation is vital in order to manage and reduce risks to 
the soundness of the banking system, just as with conventional banking. Insolvency 
risks cannot be ruled out, particularly given the Òclose link of Islamic finance with 
the real economic sector through various financing contractsÓ (Aziz, 2013). The 
banks must play an active role in enhancing and developing the economy they are 
part of. A strong banking system can assist the economy in benefiting from the Òon-
going globalization process and the liberalization of capital marketsÓ (Errico and 
Farahbaksh, 1998). This is especially relevant in developing countries, which is 
where the majority of the Islamic banking principles are followed. The banks are 
usually Òmajor (or the sole) players in the domestic financial marketsÓ (Errico and 
Farahbaksh, 1998), therefore an appropriate regulatory framework, such as the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), is vital in order to reinforce the Islamic 
bankingÕs operating environment and their market discipline.  
The IFSB has introduced prudential standards for the Islamic financial services 
industry in Òall key areas of capital adequacy, risk management, corporate 
governance and Shariah governanceÓ (Aziz, 2013). This is seen as crucial in order 
to Òpromote more consistent regulatory and supervisory frameworks across 
bordersÓ (Aziz, 2013). The standards are aligned with the key principles and 
standards adopted by the Basel Committee, which serves to reduce the opportunity 
for regulatory arbitrage and contribute towards global financial stability.  
The financial reporting rules set by the International Accounting Standards and the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), do not accurately reveal the true 
performance of Islamic banks. While there are several factors why Islamic banks do 
follow the Basel II regulations, such as them Ògaining international recognitionÓ 
(Hassan and Dicle, 2005), they have a wide range of operations that are not 
reflected in these standards, for instance the PLS accounts and Mudaraba (a sales 
contract used to finance projects) transactions. Risks in PLS accounts are shared 
between the bank and the account holder, which is not taken into account in 
conventional accounting standards. On the other hand, Mudaraba transactions 
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cannot be classified Òuntil the underlying contract expiresÓ (Sundararajan and 
Errico, 2002), as a default cannot be recognized until the investment project has 
failed to deliver what was expected, for example a loss or lower than expected 
return. 
In 1991 the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) was established to overcome the problems of conventional banking 
accounting regulations for Islamic banks. The AAOIFI Òplays a crucial role in 
pursuing the harmonization of Shariah-based rulings across jurisdictionsÓ (Sol, 
2007). The unique natures of the PLS accounts led the AAOIFI to recommend all 
Islamic banks dynamically provision, enabling Islamic banks Òto anticipate the 
expected credit losses rather than the actual lossesÓ (Quttainah et al, 2013). 
Moreover, to ensure compliance with Shariah laws, many national regulators 
require Islamic banks to have an independent board, known as the Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB). 
The SSBs delegate to bank managers the responsibility of executing approved 
Islamic products and services, as well as ensuring compliance to their religious 
guidelines. SSBs are considered a reliable source in promoting Islamic banks and 
hence attracting new customers. They play a crucial role in monitoring and 
controlling the performance of the banks, overlapping with the board of directors. 
Quttainah et al (2013) found SSB members that had a high reputation were able to 
constrain banks from smoothing. They found the SSB had to have the Òright 
structure and the right peopleÓ. The SSB auditorsÕ quality and reputation were 
Òcruical and criticalÓ in limiting earnings management. Simply having an SSB in 
itself was found to not be effective in detering earnings management. 
The PLS accounts are a great concern for Islamic banking regulators as it shifts the 
banksÕ risk to the asset side. Having adequate capital and loan loss provisions, as 
well as appropriate pricing and control of risks, are therefore vital in ensuring 
Islamic banks remain sound. Loan loss provisions Òlessen the inherent greater 
potential for moral hazard in the operation of PLSÓ (Sundararajan and Errico, 
2002). Additionally, having adequate levels of capital ensures the banks are able to 
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attract demand deposits, which of course are never remunerated, but Òmay well 
share the same risks as investment depositsÓ (Sundararajan and Errico, 2002).  
Capital and provisions protect investment deposits from excessive losses in the 
event the banksÕ earnings are hit. This avoids a flight to safety that could trigger a 
liquidity crisis against which Islamic banks may be less equipped to handle than 
conventional banks, due to their inability pay interest when borrowing capital. The 
AAOIFI Òrequires Islamic banks to report these deposits on their balance sheetsÓ 
rather than off-balance sheet, enabling Islamic banks to fulfil their capital adeqaucy 
requirements (Chapra and Khan, 2000). Considering investment deposits share 
similar risks to shareholders, the AAOIFI produced a separate capital adequacy 
ratio to take this risk into account: 
Total!capital
!Total!average!risk ! weig!ted!assets!financed!by!bank!capital!and!curent!accounts !
50%!of!total!average!risk ! weig!ted!assets!financed!by!investment!deposits!
 
The majority of countries have opted to run Islamic banks alongside conventional 
banks to enable them to continue to take advantage of conventional financial 
products that have yet to be introduced and regulated in Islamic finance. However, 
Iran, Sudan and Pakistan have transitioned into a fully Islamic financial system, 
completely abolishing interest-based banking operations (Sol, 2007, Chong & Liu, 
2009). 
2.2. Loan Loss Provisions and Basel 
Loan loss provisions are widely used by both Islamic and conventional bank 
managers when managing their lending activitiesÕ risk exposures. Provisions are 
anticipated losses that occur from lending and financing activities (Anandarajan, 
Hasan and McCarthy, 2007). All commercial banks, whether Islamic or 
conventional, Òmust comply with the risk weighted capital adequacy framework in 
using loan loss provisions as tools for managing risksÓ (Misman and Ahmad, 2011). 
A riskier asset will therefore have a higher provisioning requirement. Table 2 
presents the Basel framework that each country with a large Islamic banking 
industry has currently fully adopted. 
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Table 2: Basel adoption by country (BIS, 2012) 
Countries 
Latest Basel 
Framework Adopted 
Basel III 
implementation date 
Saudi Arabia Basel III - 
Indonesia Basel II N/A 
Kuwait Basel 2.5 2015 
Jordan Basel II N/A 
Malaysia Basel II 2019 
Oman Basel II N/A 
Pakistan Basel II 2014 
Qatar Basel II N/A 
United Arab Emirates Basel II 2018 
Bahrain Basel 2.5 2018 
 
In 1988, the Basel Committee introduced the risk weighted capital adequacy 
framework based on international standards of capital adequacy in what is referred 
to as Basel I. Subsequently in 1990, the capital adequacy framework was 
Òamended and all banks are now required to maintain a minimum total capital of 
8% from risk weighted assets (RWA) of the bankÓ (Misman and Ahmad, 2011).  
A bankÕs total capital is split into tier 1 (core) and tier 2 (supplementary) capital, 
whereby tier 1 capital Òmust be at least 4%Ó (Basle, 1988, p. 14) of RWA and 3% 
of total assets and tier 2 must not exceed the amount of tier 1 (Basle, 1988, p. 17). 
This implies that at least 50% of the amount of total capital must be tier 1, such as 
common stock or disclosed reserves. Loan loss reserves no longer counted as a 
component of tier 1 capital but rather included as part of tier 2 capital (up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of RWA). Tier 2 capital also included undisclosed reserves, 
hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments and subordinated debt (Basle, 1988, p. 
17).  Islamic banks do not hold these types of tier 2 capital as they are linked to 
the payment of interest, which is forbidden; therefore the banks focus on tier 1 
capital. Interestingly, Basel III has increased the importance of tier 1 capital, 
following the footsteps of Islamic banking. 
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Laeven and Majnoni (2003) have argued that since 1991 ÒÉfrom the perspective of 
compliance with regulatory capital requirementsÓ, it became much more effective 
for banks to Òallocate income to retained earnings (entirely included in tier 1 
capital) than to loan loss reserves (only partially included in Tier 2 capital)Ó. If a 
bank increased its loan loss reserves, the effect is Òto increase tier 2 capital while 
reducing retained earnings and tier 1 capitalÓ (Balla and Rose, 2011).  
A bankÕs loan loss reserve account is a Òcontra-asset accountÓ, used to reduce the 
value of total loans on the bankÕs balance sheet by an amount that is based on the 
bank managerÕs forecasts of losses (Balla and Rose, 2011). Loan loss reserves are a 
bankÕs first line of defence against actual loan losses (Hatfield and Lancaster, 
2000). The amount of losses is based on the most probable future state of the 
world. Considering loan loss provisions are a relatively large accrual for commercial 
banks, they have a significant effect on earnings and regulatory capital, causing 
tension between accounting priorities and supervisory priorities.  
Accounting priorities emphasise the Òobjectivity and comparability of financial 
statementsÓ (Balla and Rose, 2011) to allow for bank monitoring. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board states that an inherent credit loss should be 
recognised only once an event triggers a likely loss that Òcan be reasonably 
estimatedÓ (Balla and Rose, 2011). On the other hand, supervisory priorities focus 
on the ability of banks to maintain solvency, especially during changing business 
environments. Bank supervisors view adequate loan loss provisions as part of the 
banking systemÕs safety and soundness. A deficit in loan loss reserves implies that 
the bankÕs capital ratios do not portray the banksÕ true ability to absorb unexpected 
losses. As a result, bank managers must incorporate their future expectations of 
losses due to changing economic conditions, Òeven if no event has yet occurred to 
indicate specific estimable lossesÓ (Balla and Rose, 2011). These two contrasting 
aims can therefore be split between objective backward-looking historical data and 
subjective forward-looking expectations, which reflect a trade-off between 
transparency and the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
Loan loss provisions have been Òwidely employed by bank managers in managing 
risk on capital and earningsÓ (Misman and Ahmad, 2011, p. 95) in both Islamic and 
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conventional banks. The banks can increase their reserves by increasing loan loss 
provisions in a financially strong year. Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) explain that 
there are five objectives of using loan loss provisions: income smoothing, stock 
pricing, management bonus, provide signals about future losses and earnings, and  
to comply with legal requirements. Furthermore, they found that there are several 
determing factors that influence managerial decisions regarding loan loss 
provisions. These include non-performing loans (NPL), loan write-offs, past and 
present earnings, debt to equity ratio, capital adequacy ratio, loans-to-deposit ratio 
and the size of the bank. 
Generally, loan loss provisions can be used to cover losses from loan activities, 
meet regulatory capital requirements, and more importantly, to manage present 
and future income. Banks split loan losses into various categories based on their 
payment status, for example the loans can be split between current, 30 days past 
due, 60 days past due, 90 days past due. In addition, banks classify them based on 
the severity of delinquency that can vary by asset class. Assessments are then 
performed to decide whether a provision should be made on any of the loans, if a 
loss is probable and predictable.  
2.3. Regulation in the United Arab Emirates 
On the 17th of December 2012, the UAE central bank announced that it is delaying 
new regulatory requirements until further notice. The bank had expected national 
banks to meet certain lending and liquidity ratios to meet Basel III requirements in 
addition to being able to better withstand future market disruptions. The central 
bank however noticed that banks had significantly reduced their lending to 
government entities in order for them to meet these new requirements by the 
January 1st 2013 deadline (Failaka, 2013). It opted to provide the banks with 
further time to get to grips with these requirements. Due to the recent property 
bubble, which burst during the financial crisis, Dubai in particular had a large 
problem with non-performing loans.  
Banks in the UAE had been repositioning themselves due to the higher costs of 
complying with higher capital requirements introduced by Basel III. The time 
extension may allow UAE banks to shift their focus back to lending and investing in 
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the region, but this is yet to take effect (Hunter, 2013). Since June 2010, the banks 
have had tier 1 capital and total capital requirements of 8% and 12%, respectively, 
which Òare substantially higher than the 6% and 8% set by Basel III and expected 
to be in place by 2019Ó (Hunter, 2013). These figures demonstrate the banksÕ 
willingness to hold on to capital and their reluctance to employ their capital by 
lending. 
In 2010, the central bank announced changes to banking loan classifications and 
provisions to match international standards, as shown in Table 3. UAE banks will 
need to set loan loss provisions for personal loans which are in arrears of Ò90, 120 
and 180 days, of at least 25%, 50% and 100% of the loan, respectivelyÓ (Jarvis, 
2011). This applies to personal loans, car loans, credit cards and residential 
mortgages. No provisions are needed for loans in which borrowers have provided 
collateral to the bank and the net value exceeds the loan amount. If a defaulted 
borrower proves able to continue paying the loan, the loan category can be revised 
although it must be revisited every month for 1 year. The regulator now requires 
provisions to be booked every quarter rather than at the end of the year (Salama, 
2010). 
Table 3: United Arab EmiratesÕ loan classifications and provision requirements (Jarvis, 
2011) 
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Some loss due to 
adverse factors to 
hinder repayment or 
weakness of security 
25 
Doubtful loans 
Full recovery 
doubtful, financial 
position not sound 
50 
Loss loans 
Exhausted all 
courses of action, 
may recover nothing 
100 
13 
2.4. Regulation in Kuwait  
The Central Bank of Kuwait benefits from only having to supervise 10 local banks 
and 8 foreign bank branches. This GCC member state has focused on improving its 
regulation to meet international standards, to curb fast lending growth and slow 
down inflation. It recently raised its capital adequacy ratio requirement from 10% 
to 12% and announced that the government will guarantee 100% of customer 
deposits in local banks (Singh, 2009). In terms of accounting, Kuwaiti banks follow 
the International Financial Reporting Standards except for point number 39, which 
relates to collective provisioning. Instead, the regulator has replaced this Òspecific 
requirement for collective provisioning for a minimum general provisionÓ (Singh, 
2009). Furthermore, the banks have adopted Basel II in 2005, which has enhanced 
the level of reporting well above the regional standards.  
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Table 4: KuwaitÕs loan classifications and provision requirements (Central Bank of Kuwait, 
1996) 
Default Categories Description 
Provision 
level required 
(%) 
Special Mention 
Debt subject to any of the irregular 
conditions for a period not exceeding 
90 days, or to any of the other 
considerations associated with the 
client's position. 
Up to 
managementÕs 
discretion 
Sub-standard loans 
In case the debtor is in default of 
paying any of the overdue 
instalments for a period of 3 months 
and less than 6 months. 
20 
Doubtful loans 
In case the debtor is in default of 
paying any of the overdue 
instalments for a period of 6 months 
and less than 12 months. 
50 
Bad 
In case the debtor is in default of 
paying any of the overdue 
instalments for a period of 12 
months and more. Clients, against 
whom legal measures and actions 
have been taken, shall also be 
classified under this category. 
100 
 
2.5. Regulation in Bahrain 
Bahrain is leading the Islamic finance sector with a regulatory regime that is 
Òindustry-specific, transparent, and maintained to a standard that is comparable to 
the best of international practicesÓ (Al-Khalifa, 2011). In fact, the AAOIFI which 
most Islamic banks around the world follow was set up in Bahrain. 
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Table 5: Central Bank of BahrainÕs loan classifications and provision requirements (World 
Bank, 2000) 
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Loans that are 30-60 
days past due. 
20 
Doubtful loans 
Loans that are 60-90 
days past due. 
50 
Bad 
Loans that are over 
90 days past due. 
100 
 
2.6. Regulation in Saudi Arabia 
Loan loss provisions in Saudi Arabia are completely down to the managementÔs 
discretion, depending on Òtheir reviews of each loanÕs performance, regardless of 
how the customerÕs other loans are ratedÓ (World Bank, 2002). The countryÕs 
regulatory body does not require small loans to be classified, nor do provisions on 
them need to be made on an individual basis but rather Òallow[s] them to be 
assessed on a pooled basisÓ (World Bank, 2002). Moreover, there are no limits on 
specific and general provisions. Non-performing loans must be disclosed quarterly 
with external auditors legally required to assess the adequacy of loan loss 
provisions.  
Loan classifications in Qatar and Malaysia are shown in Table 17 and Table 18 in the 
appendix.  
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3. World Economy Overview 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century the world economy first 
experienced strong stable economic growth followed by a sharp contraction during 
the 2008/09 global financial crisis. The worldÕs economic output, measured in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), grew at a rate of approximately 3.25% before the 
financial crisis, falling to just under 2% during the period of 2008-2012 (Trading 
Economics, 2013). Reckless sub-prime lending by financial institutions in the United 
States, the worldÕs largest economy, originated the financial crisis that impacted 
countries worldwide. 
In Europe, several countries that have adopted the Euro have yet to escape the 
aftermath. Their inability to print money freely to devalue their currency to boost 
exports and increase their competitiveness, in addition to their inability to expand 
their fiscal policies due to their mounting sovereign debt levels has led to deep 
recessions. The Islamic region, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, had 
witnessed above world-average growth of 4.4% during the pre-crisis period, falling 
slightly to an average of 4.2% during and post crisis, still outstripping the rest of 
the world (Trading Economics, 2013). The sum of the 57 Islamic countriesÕ GDP 
reached $5.7 trillion, making up 8.3% of global GDP (IINA, 2012). 
The global financial crisis resulted in world output experiencing Òits sharpest drop 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, with most economies contracting in late 
2008 and early 2009Ó (Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper, 2009), deeply affecting 
investor and consumer confidence. Several notable financial institutions collapsed, 
such as Lehman Brothers, which at the time was the fourth-largest US investment 
bank and the Òbiggest in [the] history of bank failureÓ (Katie, 2012, p. 8).  Many 
other financial institutions required bailouts from their national governments such 
as Citigroup ($50 billion), Bank of America ($45 billion), BNP Paribas (!5.1 billion) 
and Socit Gnrale (!3.4 billion). The UK government spent £50 billion to part-
nationalise the countryÕs biggest banks to Òstop the financial system melting downÓ 
(Wearden, 2008). In total, eight British banks took part in the governmentÕs 
scheme. Birmingham-based Islamic Bank of Britain also required a bailout due to 
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the downturn. The Islamic bank received a £20m capital injection by Qatar 
International Islamic Bank (IBB, 2010). 
Evidently, bank failures are commonplace and happen in many countries across the 
world. Each country has certainly witnessed one of its banks fail at one point or 
another (Katie, 2012, p. 1). Furthermore, the costs that accompany a bank failure 
are substantial, as highlighted by the examples provided in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Recent Bank Bailouts (NY Times, 2009, NAO, 2013) 
 
3.1. Islamic Banking and the Financial Crisis 
The Islamic banking sector has largely avoided being a victim of the global financial 
crisis that has brought down some of the largest and most reknown banks around 
the world. It has remained Òon the sidelines of the unrestÓ (Kettell, 2010, p. vii). A 
key factor that has helped Islamic banks escape the financial crisisÕ full impact is 
the fact that the Islamic banking model does not allow investments in complex 
derivatives, many of which ended up being toxic assets whose value fell 
significantly and whose markets stopped functioning. 
A recent IMF Survery (2010) compared the performance of Islamic banks to 
conventional banks globally and found that the former performed better, given the 
Òlarge losses incurred by conventional banks in Europe and the US as a result of the 
crisisÓ.  On average, Islamic banks Òshowed stronger resilienceÓ (IMF Survery, 
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2010). The survey then compared the two forms of banking in the GCC in addition 
to Jordan and Malaysia. It found that Islamic banks did perform better in terms of 
profitability in 2008, although conventional banks ended up faring better in 2009 
once the crisis hit the real economy. 
Al-Atrash & Hardy (2010) found that factors relating to the Islamic banking 
business model Òhelped limit the adverse impact on profitability in 2008, while 
weaknesses in risk management practices in some Islamic banks led to a larger 
decline in profitability in 2009 compared to conventional banksÓ. In addition, 
Islamic banksÕ credit and asset growth during the crisis performed better than their 
conventional counterparts, Òcontributing to financial and economic stabilityÓ. Beck 
et al (2010), who compared the two types of banks and their performances across 
many countries, concluded that although both were impacted during the crisis, 
Islamic banks had higher capitalisation and liquidity reserves, allowing them to 
withstand better. Parashar and Venkatesh (2010) confirmed these findings and 
added that while ÒIslamic banksÕ CAR [Capital Adequecy Ratio] showed downward 
trend, still its average was higher than conventional [banks]Ó. 
In terms of growth in credit and assets, Islamic banks continued to be higher in all 
countries, with the UAE being an exception. Furthermore, the majority of Islamic 
banksÕ overall risk assessment had been Òbetter than or similarÓ to conventional 
banks. This characteristic, in addition to their lower leverage and higher solvency 
resulted in them showing Òstronger resilenceÓ (on average) during the crisis, 
allowing them to Òmeet a relatively stronger demand for credit and maintain stable 
external ratingsÓ. Sir Andrew Cahn (2009), the Chief Executive Officer of UK Trade 
& Investment, also noted Islamic financeÕs strength stating, "Though no sector is 
immune to the global financial crisis, Islamic finance has shown great resilienceÓ.  
These findings distinguish Islamic and conventional banks and their ability to 
manage a crisis, like the one experienced in 2007-2009, and has drawn ever more 
attention to their business stratagies. 
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3.2. United Arab EmiratesÕ Banking Sector 
Within the UAE, Dubai was the hardest hit by the global economic downturn due to 
its booming real estate market. The UAE central bank had to provide $13.61 billion 
in support to its banking sector during the financial crisis. The Finance Ministry had 
to step in with a further $20 billion in emergency loans and a 3-year blanket bank 
deposit guarantee (The National, 2011). The regulator was forced to strengthen the 
banking sector with more stringent requirements, such as higher down payments 
on car loans and consumer loans to reduce reliance on the central bank as a lender 
of last resort. Asset quality in the country Òdeteriorated significantlyÓ in 2009 and 
the trend continued in 2010, with an Òaverage NPL to gross loans ratio of banks 
increasing to 4.3% in 2009 from 1.7% at end-2008Ó (Moukahal, 2011).  
The country as a whole has since fully recovered from the crisis with non-oil 
activities contributing 41.5% to GDP and financial services growing 13.6% in 2011 
(Statistics Centre, 2012). The Central Bank of the UAE estimates non-performing 
loans Òmay finally have peaked at 8.7% in December 2012Ó (IMF, 2013). Further, 
the regulator believes the banking system could Òabsorb even a significant increase 
in non-performing loansÓ (IMF, 2013).  
In 2010, the central bank had stated that short-term liquidity in Islamic banks 
remained an issue that had to be addressed (Sambidge, 2011). Miniaoui and Gohou 
(2011) found that in the United Arab Emirates, which has a remarkably high 
number of banks (23 in 2010), conventional banks performed better than Islamic 
banks unlike the rest of the GCC. Notably, since the crisis they seem to Òclose the 
differenceÓ although explanations for why this gap remains unclear. 
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3.3. KuwaitÕs Banking Sector 
Kuwait is considered to be one of the pioneer countries in Islamic banking activities. 
Islamic banking has grown from having $63.2 billion in assets (32.1% of total 
banking assets) in 2008 to $78.6 billion (37.7%) by the end of 2012. Deposits grew 
from 25% to 35.9% during the same time frame. This tremendous level of growth 
can be attributed to the countryÕs confidence that this industry is a viable 
alternative to the usual methods of banking. The Governor of the Central Bank of 
Kuwait states that these figures reflect Òthe proven successes of the Islamic 
financial industry in KuwaitÓ, with the banks becoming Òa cornerstone in the Kuwaiti 
economy and a significant resource for banking and financial activity in the state of 
KuwaitÓ (Al-Hashel, 2013). These statistics highlight the fact that Islamic banks 
continued to increase their assets, attract depositors and their financing by more 
than $10 billion both during and after the crisis. 
The major conventional banks in the country are acquiring stakes in Islamic banks 
and opening Islamic windows to allow them to better compete with the rising 
prominence of Islamic finance in the country. The real estate sector continues to be 
a drag on profitability due to the higher provisioning on real estate loans. This has 
forced many European banks out of the country and the wider GCC region 
(Karthikeyan, 2013). Due to loan growth in the country being highly correlated to 
government spending, it is also perceived as a problem. 
The economy, which is heavily reliant on its oil sector, was heavily hit by the 
financial crisis when oil prices dropped, however has since recovered. The finance 
sector represents 14% of GDP relative to the oil sectors 49%, as illustrated by 
Figure 2. The downturn Ònegatively affected the financial system and governmentÕs 
fiscal positionÓ (Arab Times, 2013). The government was forced to react and as 
such boosted its fiscal spending to $22.5 billion, accompanied by the Òapproval of a 
four-year development planÓ worth $104 billion (Arab Times, 2013). In addition, 
the Central Bank significantly cut the discount rate to help support the economy. 
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Figure 2: KuwaitÕs GDP by sector in 2010 (Central Bank of Kuwait, 2011) 
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3.4. BahrainÕs Banking Sector 
Bahrain is recognised internationally as one of the more diversified economies in 
the region, with its financial sector being the second largest contributor to GDP, as 
depicted in Figure 3. According to the Central Bank of Bahrain (2013) the country 
has 24 Islamic banks with assets of $25.8 billion, out of 112 financial institutions 
with assets of $190.2 billion.  It was the first to place emphasis on Islamic Banking 
and Òto nurture the concepts, rules and common standards of Shariah complianceÓ 
(Bahrain, 2013). During the crisis, Islamic banks in the country were able to 
withstand the downturn Òbut the effect comes after the crisis periodÓ (Hidayat and 
Abduh, 2012). For example the oldest and one of the largest Islamic banks in the 
country, Bahrain Islamic bank, continued to report losses even by the end of 2012 
after having to raise its provisions by $108 million in 2011 to protect itself from 
Òdifficult local and international market and economic challengesÓ (BIB, 2013). 
Figure 3: BahrainÕs GDP by sector in 2012 (CIO, 2013) 
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4. Literature Review 
4.1. Income Smoothing 
In 1981, Scheiner first explored income smoothing, also known as earnings 
management, in the United States. It refers to a managerÕs ability to make 
decisions on financial reporting and Òstructuring of transactionsÓ (Taktak, Zouari 
and Boudriga, 2010, p. 96) and is considered one of the most significant factors 
that influence banks in making decisions on loan loss provisions. Bank managers 
estimate loan loss provisions to reflect changes in expected future loan losses, 
providing them with wide leeway for discretion. They are subject to Òsignificant 
reputation and regulatory pressures to ensure the smoothness of earningsÓ 
(Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010). Significantly, managerial income and bonuses 
are linked with performance targets, further motivating stable earnings growth 
trends. 
Loan loss provisioning is Òa key aspect of bank financial reporting for regulators and 
outside investors interested in monitoring risk-taking behaviourÓ (Bushman and 
Williams, 2007: 31).  The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and bank 
regulatory agencies have both paid a lot of attention to loan loss provisions due to 
its discretionary attribute. For example, in 1998 the SEC ordered SunTrust bank to 
Òtrim the loan loss provisions it made in 1994, 1995 and 1996 as part of a broader 
investigation of earnings management in bankingÓ (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and 
Mathieu, 2001). This followed an upward restatement of the firmÕs profits for the 
three years and a reduction in its loan loss reserves by $100 million. In addition, 
the SEC released a statement asserting despite attributes of provisioning, ÒIt must 
not be used to manipulate earnings or mislead investorsÓ (SEC, 1998). This 
provisioning behaviour itself has been a source of substantial debate. Much focus 
has been placed with respect to whether earnings smoothing Òincreases the 
information content of earnings by revealing innate fundamentalsÓ or, whether in 
fact it does the opposite and reduces the transparency of the fundamentals of a 
bank (Bushman and Williams, 2007). 
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Kanagaretnam et al (2001) found that bank managers save earnings through the 
use of loan loss provisions (increasing their provisions) in strong financial years and 
borrow earnings using loan loss provisions (lowering their provisions) during 
financial performances that are not seen as acceptable. Kim and KrossÕ (1998) 
research provides evidence that adequately capitalised banks are treated differently 
to well capitalised banks by regulators, i.e. less restrictions and supervision. 
Fudenberg and TiroleÕs (1995) found that during poor performances, managers 
boost reported performance by making positive discretionary accruals to reduce the 
likelihood of dismissal or interference by regulators. During periods of strong 
financial performances, managers are not overly concerned with dismissal or 
interference which leads to them saving current income for future periods where 
they might do poorly, by making negative accruals.  
A second key factor that incentivises managers to income smooth is a bankÕs need 
for external financing. High earnings volatility in the industry raises the likelihood of 
bank failures and is therefore Òa leading indicator of the overall risk of the banking 
systemÓ (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010). Farook et al (2010) adds that unlike 
investors in banks, Òneither bank managers nor regulators are able to diversify the 
effects of such idiosyncratic risksÓ. Given that a bankÕs cost of financing depends its 
percieved risk, bank managers will want to smooth income to reduce income 
volaltility. Both Òmanagement and existing shareholders benefit if the bank can 
raise additional financing on more favorable termsÓ (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and 
Mathieu, 2001, p. 7). 
Ahmed et al (1999) discovered that regulatory changes in 1990 have reduced the 
costs of income smoothing. Under the new regime, increasing earnings via loan loss 
provisions achieve a smaller impact on a bankÕs capital, implying that Òsmoothing 
earnings via loan loss provisions is less costlyÓ (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 
1999). 
Collins et al (1995) found evidence that supports a positive relationship between 
loan loss provisions and earnings, which is consistent with income smoothing. 
TaktakÕs (2010) study also found a Òsignificant proportion of commerical banks in 
OECD countries tend to smooth their results intentionallyÓ. While Wall & Koch 
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(2000) found evidence that suggests banks have an incentive to manage reported 
earnings, they did not see it as conclusive. Further, Misman and Ahmad (2011) 
found both Islamic and conventional banks in Mayalsia used loan loss provisions for 
both earnings and capital management, supporting Zoubi and Al-KhazaliÕs (2007) 
study on 55 conventional and 10 Islamic banks operating in the GCC, which 
concluded they use loan loss provisions to manage earnings. Misman and Ahmad 
(2011) reveal Islamic banks Òbehave differently in their loan loss provisions 
management on the issue of capital smoothingÓ putting forward the contention of 
Islamic banks having Òdifferent capital ratios concerning loan loss provisionsÓ.  
Islamic banks should be no less subjected to such incentives to smooth earnings. In 
fact, their contractural structure suggests they may have even more reason to 
smooth their earnings (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010). While Islamic banks 
operate on the profit-and-loss sharing princple, some Òstrive to provide distributions 
that mimic benchmark interest ratesÓ (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010) to allow 
them to compete with conventional banks and avoid disappointing their customers. 
If fundamental asset returns deviate from benchmark rates, some Islamic banks 
Òmay sacrifice their own share of earnings to maintain a competitive rate for their 
depositorsÓ (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010).  
Sundararajan (2005) found, from a sample of 14 Islamic banks in 8 countries, a 
considerable smoothing of returns paid to profit sharing investment accounts, 
despite wide divergences in risk. This creates a revenue volatility risk that the 
Islamic banksÕ shareholers have to bear, which in theory should be borne by the 
depositors, underlining the importance of smooth earnings for Islamic bank 
managers. Islamic bank managers are therefore exposed to pressure from 
shareholders in addition to investment depositors. 
Moreover, Islamic banks will likely focus on the distributions to investment 
depositors over shareholders due to access to depositor funding being relatively 
cheaper, which may not necessarily be a negative outcome for shareholders. Most 
shareholders in Islamic banks are Òinstitutional investors or high net worth 
individualsÓ (Farook, Hassan and Clinch, 2010), implying they are able to diversify 
their assets, and therefore their risks. 
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In contrast, Beatty et al (1995) did not find any evidence to support income 
smoothing. Taktak et al (2010) used a sample of 66 Islamic banks in Muslim 
countries over the period of 2001-2006 and discovered Islamic banks do not 
smooth income via loan loss provisions. Similarly, Taktak (2011), using a sample of 
79 banks from 19 countries during the same period, found that Islamic banks do 
not use discretion to smooth their earnings.  
Othman and Mersni (2012)Õs comparative study between conventional and Islamic 
banks in the Middle East found that Islamic banks, in fact, did not use discretionary 
loan loss provisions to manage their earnings but rather only to manage their 
capital. They found Islamic banks and conventional banks used loan loss provisions 
in the same manner, concluding Òall banks behave in the same wayÓ. 
4.2. Capital Management 
Ahmed et al (1999) states that changes brought into place in 1990 Òsubstantially 
alters bankÕs incentives to manage capital and earnings via loan loss provisionsÓ 
because of new capital requirements. These requirements limit the use of loan loss 
reserves as reguatory capital in two ways. Firstly, loan loss reserves no longer 
count as part of Tier 1 capital. Secondly, they only count as part of the total capital 
up to 1.25% of RWA. These changes imply Òa less negative relation between capital 
and loan loss provisionsÓ (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999) as low capital banks 
have less incentive to increase loan loss provisions. Banks exceeding the upper 
bound on loan loss reserves face Òdiminishing incentivesÓ to use provisions in 
capital management.  
Using a sample of 113 conventional bank holding companies, Ahmed et al (1999) 
discovered that the relation between loan loss provisions and capital is more 
negative for banks with above average loan growth, consequently Òbenefiting more 
from capital management than other banksÓ and supporting the capital 
management theory. This could be particularly applicable to Islamic banks 
considering their relatively high loan growth. 
Further evidence by Collins et al (1995) suggests that banks with less capital tend 
to have lower LLP than banks with higher levels of capital. Having studied Malaysian 
27 
banks, Ismail and Shahimi (2003) noted that such banks were inclined to rely on 
loan loss provisions to meet their tier 2 capital requirements. Misman and AhmadÕs 
(2011) found that both Islamic banks and conventional banks in Malaysia used loan 
loss provisions as Òan important tool in their earnings management and capital 
mangementÓ. 
In contrast, Beatty et al (1995), Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al (1999) 
found capital management does not have a positive influence on provisions.  Zoubi 
and Al-Khazali (2007) found Islamic banks in the GCC do not use loan loss 
provisions to manage their capital and reserve requirements. Quttainah et al (2013) 
found that Islamic banks are Òless likely to conduct earnings managementÓ 
compared to non-Islamic banks. Ismail and Shahimi (2003) note in their study that 
Islamic banks do not rely on Tier 2 capital to fulfil their capital requirements 
supporting the notion that Islamic banks rarely hold any Tier 2 capital. 
4.3. Signalling private information 
Previous papers have examined managersÕ use of loan loss provisions to signal 
private information about future changes in earnings. A large increase in provisions 
provides the market with information about the true quality of the loan portfolio 
and represents a Òsignal of impending asset write-downsÓ (Musumeci and Sinkey, 
1989). WahlenÕs (1994) states that considering commerical bank loan portfolios are 
Òtypically 10 to 15 times larger than bank equityÓ, any changes to bank loan cash 
flows and default risks are Òlikely to have an important impact on the bank stock 
market valuesÓ. His research found a positive relationship between loan loss 
provisions and future changes in pre-loan loss earnings, consistent with the 
signalling private information theory.  
Beaver et al (1989) and Beaver and Engel (1996) discovered that investors 
interpret an unexpected increase in provisions as a sign of strength as it signals a 
bankÕs Òintentions and abilities to resolve its problem debt situationÓ 
(Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Yang, 2003). Liu and Ryan (1995) went one step further 
and found that investors specifically reacted positively to additions to loan loss 
reserves for banks with sizeable, frequently renegotiated loans, such as mortgages 
and commerical loans. On the other hand, Ahmed et al (1999) found no such 
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evidence of a positive relation between loan loss provisions and one-year ahead 
future change in earnings in their sample of 113 banks between the period of 1986-
1995, contrary to both Beaver et al (1989) and Wahlen (1994).  
Hatfield and Lancaster (2000) established that the market may view increases as 
negative Òdue to the surprise factor, a situation where investors were previously 
unaware of problems in a bankÕs loan portfolioÓ. They explained that the market will 
take this to mean it is the only beginning of the corrective process. If however, the 
additions to loan loss reserves are seen as a way to increase tax savings or a 
change in policy towards the borrower, then the market would view it as a positive 
signal. They conclude that the market response varies according to the reasoning 
behind the announcements and how much knowledge investors already have 
regarding the non-performing loans. 
More recent work by Kanagaretnam et al (2003) took into consideration various 
bank sizes. The study found that different bank managers face Òdifferent conditions 
and have different incentives, [therefore] their propensitives to signal their private 
information vary cross-sectionallyÓ. The empirical evidence discovered that there 
was a negative relation between a bankÕs size and the propensity to signal, 
suggesting small banks have more incentive to signal to prospects to the market. 
Furthermore, they found a positive relation with earnings variablity, future 
investment opportunities and degree of income smoothing. 
4.4. Provisioning and the Economic Cycle  
The global financial crisis was a product of many interlinked factors; however, the 
procyclicality of banking operations has Ògenerally been perceived as a root causeÓ 
(Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 2012). Many agree that the regulatory framework 
should limit it. Cavallo and MajnoniÕs (2001) results found Òonly through sound 
provisioning practices minimum capital regulation can lose its procyclical featuresÓ. 
Risk-based bank minimum capital requirements have a tendency of producing a 
procyclical effect on the economy (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). 
Laeven and MajnoniÕs (2002) econometric analysis on 1,419 banks in 45 countries 
deduces that banks Òon average postpone provisioning when faced with favorable 
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cyclical and income conditions until negative conditions set itÓ. During economic 
downturns, the quality of banksÕ loan portfolios inevitably deteriorates increasing 
their risk exposure, which simultaneously increases their level of capital 
requirements. Basel IIÕs risk weighting associated with each loan is Ònegatively 
related to the borrowerÕs credit qualityÓ implying that when the overall credit quality 
deteriorates, capital requirements become Òmore stringentÓ (Covas and Fujita, 
2010). This occurs just when capital becomes Òmore expensive or simply 
unavailable to weaker institutionsÓ (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002).  
The discussion on the procyclicality of provisioning erupted since the 1988 Capital 
Accord was originally enforced in G10 economies, and subsequently, the 
introduction of Basel-like approaches in the rest of the world. The debate is split 
between bank stability and credit supply. Many believe that risk exposures should 
be explicitly mirrored in the level of bank capital to avoid regulatory arbitrage and 
ensure the stability of the banking system. On the other hand, others see this as 
problematic during economic downturns due to a contraction in credit supply 
caused by the higher capital requirements that exacerbate downturns. Critics of the 
solvency ratios discipline warn that Òcontrolling individual risk positions may not 
always minimize systemic risksÓ (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002) and strict capital 
requirements can have negative liquidity effects. 
Syron (1991) first used the expression Ôcapital crunchÕ to label, not the drain of 
deposits in banks, but rather the Òshrinking availability of credit from banksÓ during 
the early 1990s recession in the United Sates. Syron argued that the capital crunch 
Òcontributed to the severity of the recession in New EnglandÓ (Bernanke and Lown, 
1991) as banks sold off assets and scaled bank lending to meet regulatory capital 
standards, including the new international standards being phased under the Basel 
Accord during that period. 
One of the key concerns, especially from a macroeconomic point of view, is that 
banksÕ capital regulation has clearly induced procyclicality, amplifying the 
macroeconomic flucatations that occur. Repullo and Suarez (2009) found that under 
Basel II, procyclicality can indeed be sizeable. In addition, Covas and Fujita (2010) 
found this to be more prounced around the peaks and troughs of the business 
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cycle. In countries where banks are the key lenders to corporations, any cut back in 
lending by the banks can lead to a credit crunch, which would Òin turn exacerbate 
the downturnÓ (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004). 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) explain that there are two fundamental links 
between the business cycle and provisioning. Firstly, as previously mentioned, is 
credit risk, which is the strongest link out of the two. Whilst the Ôclassical viewÕ 
assumes that risk increases during a downturn and vice versa causing 
procyclicality, an alternative view is that of Borio et al (2001) and Lowe (2002). 
Borio et al (2001) state that credit risk Òincreases as economic booms matureÓ, 
particularly when Òloan growth is relatively highÓ (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004). 
The second link is attributed to earnings. Sound provisioning, via income smoothing 
by prudent banks that shift income from the good years to the bad years, can 
reduce the procyclical impact of provisioning and overcome the build up of credit 
risk. 
According to the countercyclical view, provisions should be positively correlated 
with the lending cycle, and therefore, banks should build up loan loss reserves in 
good times to be drawn on in bad times. This view assumes forward-looking risk 
assessment by banks. In reality, it can be extremely difficult to predict when the 
economy peaks given the business cycle is inconsistent in duration and amplitude. 
The idea of shortsightedness in economic or financial decision making was 
introduced by Kahneman & Tversky (1973) and then developed further by Minksy 
(1982). He contributed the idea of ÒexcessÓ lending that takes place during good 
times, which is corrected during recessions.  
Islamic banks are not seen to be as procyclical as conventional banks due to a 
fundamental regulatory difference that separates them from the majority of 
conventional banks with regards to their provisioning policy. The AAOIFO 
recommends that Islamic banks adopt dynamic provisioning (or statistical 
provisioning), to allow them to anticipate their credit risk and set provisions aside 
to take into account Òexpected losses rather than actual lossesÓ (Taktak et al, 2010, 
Quttainah et al, 2013). This policy is seen to naturally smooth earnings while 
strengthening the soundness of the banks as it helps anticipate and cover credit 
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losses along the lending cycle. The policy sets up a safety net of funds that can be 
used during periods of distress. Islamic banks must Òpreserve an adequate level of 
provisioning against the impairment of assets and problem exposures by 
recognizing a general and specific provisionÓ (Taktak et al, 2010). The general 
provision, used to cover unexpected losses, is based on a percentage of the 
financing portfolio. 
Similarly, Spain introduced a dynamic provisioning system in July 2000, which was 
based on risk assessment with a longer time horizon. The World Bank (2009) stated 
dynamic provisioningÕs Òanticyclical nature enhances the resilience of both 
individual banks and the banking system as a wholeÓ. Banco de Espana, SpainÕs 
central bank, put this into place to Òcope with a sharp increase in credit risk on 
Spanish banksÕ balance sheets following a period of significant credit growth during 
the late 1990sÓ (Mahapatra, 2012). In addition, there was a significant reduction in 
non-performing loans, whilst heavy competition between banks led to inadequate 
loan pricing. In 1999, Spain had the Òlowest ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
loans among OECD countriesÓ with the Òhighest correlation between the 
provisioning ratio and the GDP growth rateÓ (Mahapatra, 2012). Clearly the 
countryÕs banks were very procyclical, explaining the motivation behind the central 
bankÕs decisions to increase the provisions made during the boom period. Other 
countries, such as France and the Netherlands, started to allow Òcertain forward 
looking elements in provisioningÓ (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004). Uruguay, 
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia followed SpainÕs lead in dynamic provisioning whilst 
Mexico and Chile switched to provisioning based solely on expected loan loss 
(Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 2012). 
SpainÕs initial dynamic provisioning regime comprised of banks building up a 
statistical provision during periods of expansion which was charged quarterly on the 
profit and loss account. This fund, which had an upper and lower limit, was then 
built up to be used when Òspecific provisions grow above the average latent riskÓ 
(World Bank, 2009). Since loan portfolios, such as credit cards, mortgages or small 
and medium-enterprise loans, are not similar in their credit risk, the latent risk, 
described as the Òrisk parameter dependent upon the credit growthÓ (Mahapatra, 
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2012), also had to differ. Banco de Espana offered banks a standard model that 
could be used to calculate latent loss depending on the loan portfolio. This dynamic 
provisioning method was seen as excessive and seen to favour income smoothing. 
In 2004, SpainÕs central bank revised the provisioning system due to new EU wide 
reporting standards and in response to what many considered a provisioning 
system contrary to the Ôfair valueÕ principles. The revised model reverted to only 
two types of loan loss provisions; general and specific provisions.  The general 
(statistical) provisions were split into two components, alpha (the latent loss) and 
beta (the average specific provision for, ideally, a full business cycle). Each loan 
type had its own alpha and beta value (in percentages) which increased based on 
the assetÕs risk characteristics. The alpha was the Òaverage estimate of credit 
lossesÓ whilst the beta was the Òhistorical average of specific provisionsÓ 
(Mahapatra, 2012). The new general provisions depended on Òboth the stock of 
loans and new loan productionÓ (Fernndez de Lis and Herrero, 2009). In the 
calculation of the new general provision, specific provisions compensate similarily to 
the way the previous statistical provision worked. This implies that in an upturn 
where specific provisions would be expected to be low due to lower non-performing 
loans, Ògeneric provisions would rise due to credit growthÓ (Fernndez de Lis and 
Herrero, 2009). A new limit for the general provisions was created, between 33% 
and 125% of the alpha, to Òavoid under provisioning and excess provisioningÓ 
(Mahapatra, 2012). The formula to calculate general provisions is shown in 
Equation 1. 
Equation 1: General Provisions (Fernndez de Lis and Herrero, 2009) 
Generic!provisions! ! ! new!loan!production!!!! ! ! stock!of!loans!!!! !! !specific!provisions! 
The events since 2007 showed a dramatic turn. As the global financial crisis hit 
Spain, both GDP and credit plummeted rapidly with non-performing loans rising 
swiftly, forcing a fivefold increase in specific provisions between summer 2007 and 
spring 2009. Generic provisions also decreased very quickly, but Ònot sufficiently to 
compensate for the increase in specific provisionsÓ (Fernndez de Lis and Herrero, 
2009). By the end of 2009, the Spanish banks went from being a model for the rest 
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of the world due to seemingly dodging the financial crisis, to requiring a $125 billion 
bailout in 2012 (Weil, 2012). Many blamed their provisioning system for their ability 
to mis-report losses. The third largest bank in the country, Bankia, was forced to 
restate its 2011 results Òto show a 3.3 billion-euro ($4.2 billion) loss rather than a 
40.9 million-euro profitÓ (Weil, 2012). 
Fernndez de Lis and Herrero (2009) indicate that whilst the provisioning system 
did indeed create a cushion in the good times, it did not discourage credit growth or 
the rise in house prices. During a large enough economic boom, such as the one 
Spain experienced, the impact of an additional provision on credit supply is 
minimal. They concluded that any solution to the procyclicalicty problem must 
maintain the Òequilibirum between making regulation more anti-cyclicalÓ whilst 
Òreinforcing transprency of banksÕ accounting statementsÓ. Furthermore, Mahapatra 
(2012) asserts economic cycles can be too powerful to counteract the impact of 
prudential rules Òif there is a serial underestimation of risksÓ, as was the case in 
Spain. 
Interestingly, Uruguay implemented a slightly modified version of the Spanish 
dynamic provisioning system in 2001. Their formula maintained a different upper 
limit to the statistical fund, specifically a limit of 3% of total loans, even after Spain 
moved to a limit linked to latent loss in 2005. This led banks in Uruguay to hold 
vast amounts of provisions which were Òas high as six times non-performing loansÓ 
(Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 2012). In 2011 regulators overhauled the formula 
to Òalign provisioning rates with expected loss[es]Ó (Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 
2012). Significantly, both Uruguay and Spain now require banks to dynamically 
provision solely against non-performing loans. 
These two cases highlight that provisioning may be affected by country-specific 
circmstances with respect to accounting, regulatory and tax rules in addition to 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, such as the national economy, asset 
bubbles and managerial attitudes to risk. Even though dynamic provisioning can 
increase financial stability by recognising losses early in an economic cycle and 
building up a buffer, there is no guarantee that the provisions will be enough to 
cope with all the credit losses during a downturn, especially during longer economic 
34 
and credit booms. In the case of Uruguay, the banks held too much capital that it 
negatively impacted lending and the economy, forcing regulatory reform. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) conclude that Òprovisioning appears to depend 
significantly on the business cycleÓ implying that banksÕ provisioning behaviour is 
procyclical. This procyclicality is slightly mitigated by either Òdubious income 
smoothing or to recommendable farsighted dynamic provisioningÓ.  
Wezel et al (2012) found that dynamic provisioning can Òsmooth provisioning costs 
over the credit cycle and lower banksÕ probability of defaultÓ. Moreover, they find 
strong support for dynamic provisioning as a tool for countercyclical banking 
policies. Using Monte-Carlo simulations they discovered that the countercyclical 
buffer, which dynamic provisioning builds up, tends to reduce a bankÕs chances of 
default leading to a strengthened financial system. Balla and McKenna (2009), Fillat 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2010) and Wezel (2010) all found support for the notion 
that dynamic provisioning, when properly regulated, can help absorb rising loan 
losses in a downturn and thus be a useful tool to mitigate the risk of the financial 
system. Furthermore, Lim et al. (2011) and Peydr-Alcald et al (2011) found that 
dynamic provisioning is effective in moderating credit growth, although Òthis is not 
expected of dynamic provisioningÓ (Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 2012). 
4.5. Basel III 
The financial turmoil of 2008/09 has raised awareness amongst the major 20 
economies regarding the procyclicality problem in the regulatory framework, 
influencing the group to address it. The G20 regarded it as a Òkey issue to be 
addressedÓ (Repullo and Saurina, 2011) in order to restore confidence to the 
markets and the world economy. They set a 2009 deadline in the G20 ÔProgress 
ReportÕ to take forward recommendations to ensure financial regulations Òdampen 
rather than amplify economic cycles, including by building a buffer of resources 
during the good timesÓ (G20 Progress Report, 2009). During the same year, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) published a document that 
considered four objectives to address procyclicality which were: 
‐ Dampening any excess cyclicality of the minimium capital requirement 
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‐ Promoting forward looking provisions 
‐ Conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector 
that can be used in stress 
‐ Achieve the broader macropredutential goal by protecting the banking sector 
from periods of excess credit growth 
The third and fourth objectives resulted in the capital conservation buffer and the 
countercyclical capital buffer in the new regulatory framework known as Basel III, 
which major economies are expected to fully implement by 2018. Both were set up 
in light of the financial crisis that lead to the destabilising of the banking sector. 
Basel III aims to tackle procyclicality via these two elements by building up the 
buffers during profitable cycles that can be drawn upon during periods of stress. In 
addition, Basel III will increase the minimum capital requirements of common 
equity to 4.5% (excluding the capital conservation buffer of 2.5%), up from the 2% 
in Basel II and, Òlends support to forward-looking loan loss provisioning, which 
comprises dynamic provisioningÓ (Wezel, Chan-Lau and Columba, 2012). Peru is 
currently the only country to explicilty use both countercyclical capital buffer and 
dynamic provisioning in combination. 
The new capital conservation buffer of 2.5% will ensure banks maintain a buffer of 
capital that can be used to absorb losses without going below the minumum capital 
requirements. Importantly, it will reduce the possiblity of Òa self-reinforcing adverse 
cycle of losses and credit cutbacksÓ (Cruana, 2010). The second buffer, known as 
the countercyclical capital buffer, aims to increase a bankÕs capital defences in 
periods of extreme credit growth, especially if seen by national regulators to be 
Òaggravating system-wide riskÓ (Cruana, 2010). This buffer will be in the range of 0 
to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, with national authorties having the ability to 
implement a higher buffer if it is deemed appropriate. Reductions in the buffer take 
effect immediately whilst decisions to increase it must be pre-announced by up to 
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12 months (AFME1, 2012). The IMF (2011) characterised the countercyclical capital 
as potentially cushioning the economyÔs real output during a crisis. 
If banks fail to meet the additional capital requirement, i.e. their capital falls within 
the capital conservation range, they will be able to conduct business as usual, 
however, will be subject to restrictions on capital distrubition (dividends, share 
repurchases and discretionary staff bonuses). These distribution constraints 
increase as the bankÕs capital falls closer to the minimum capital requirements. By 
design, the constraints imposed on banks with capital levels at the top of this range 
would be minor, reflecting the expectation that banksÕ capital levels Òwill from time 
to time fall into this rangeÓ (Lekatis, 2011). Repullo and Suarez (2012) add that 
banks may hold capital buffers because Òthey wish to reduce the risk of facing a 
statically binding requirement in the futureÓ. This in effect further reduces a bankÕs 
procyclicality.  
Repullo and Saurina (2011) concluded that a micro-oriented supervisor concerned 
about bank failures would Ònaturally be averse to reducing capital requirements in a 
downturnÓ and even a macro-oriented supervisor would Òprobaly do too little too 
lateÓ, contributing to a further reduction of credit supply. Repullo and Saurina 
(2011) state that Basel III in its current shape will not help dampen the 
procyclicality of bank capital regulation and Òmay even exacerbate itÓ due to the 
continued use of risk-sensitive capital requirements, which are by defintion highly 
procyclical.  
Repullo (2013) believes Basel III Òreinforces the quality and quantity of the 
minimum capital required to banksÓ and the reforms Òconstitute a move in the right 
directionÓ. Harzi (2013) adds that it has a clear positive impact in terms of 
competition for Islamic banks as conventional banks will Òsee their capital (all 
things being equal) decrease by a larger share than Islamic banksÓ implying they 
will experience higher costs of compliance. The redefinition of capital has Òa quite 
important impact on the conventional banksÓ whereas Islamic banks will marginally 
be affected due to their capital already being in the form of tier 1.  Additionally, the 
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majority of Islamic banks already maintain higher capital levels than the current 
regulatory minumum. For example, the average tier 1 ratio of 18 Islamic banks in 
Qatar is about 22.8%.  
4.6. Cultures and Incentives 
Different provisioning policies can work in certain countries and fail in others, as 
shown by Spain and Uruguay. This is emphasised further by the contrasting results 
from numerous research papers and is due to different incentives, diverse cultures, 
varying regulatory pressures and uncommon economic cycles. For example, 
dynamic provisioning has been successfully implemented in Islamic banking whilst 
it has failed in Spain and Uruguay. Islamic bankingÕs successful implementation of 
dynamic provisioning can be attributed to the religious link that unites the banking 
sectorÕs regulatory and fundamental values and principles. This implies all the 
banks take very similar attitudes towards risk and the way in which they protect 
themselves from these risks. 
All Islamic banks follow the principle of Ôbalance between moral and material 
requirementÕ, encouraging the banks to acquire physical assets under their 
ownership before selling them to their clients. This bears a significant implication in 
that it reduces the banksÕ chance of overextending their use of credit and Òhence 
their profitabilityÓ (Taktak et al, 2010). In contrast, conventional banks have no 
such requirements and tend to excessively use credit and debt financing that can 
lead to larger financial risks, especially during times of difficulty as experienced 
during 2008/09. 
Clearly, the success of implementing dynamic provisioning in Islamic banks has 
acquired the attention of international regulators. Basel III provisioning policies are 
very similar to the way Islamic banks currently operate with regards to raising a 
safety net of funds to be used during times of stress. The policies alone however 
will not insulate conventional banks from future crises if managerial moral towards 
opportunism are not tackled, as dynamic provisioning heavily relies on managerial 
discretion. Abdul Rahman and Abdullah (2005) found banks in Malaysia with Muslim 
managers practiced less earnings management than ones directed by non-Muslim 
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managers, pointing out the significance of managerial attitude and discretion. 
Quttainah et al (2013) adds that Islamic law plays an integral role in shaping ethical 
behaviors of managers, managing the allocation of resources and the distribution of 
income and wealth. Further, the Shariah Supervisory Board of each Islamic bank 
plays an important role in ensuring compliance, adding an extra regulatory pressure 
on managers to discourage Òopportunistic behavioursÓ.  
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5. Data and methodology 
5.1. Sample and data 
The initial sample of Islamic banks from the international database ÒBankscopeÓ 
comprised an unbalanced panel of 147 banks. After removing unconsolidated bank 
data and any banks that had less than two years of reported loan loss provisions 
data, the sample size was reduced to 60 Islamic banks covering the period between 
2002 and 2012. Using consolidated data ensures any subsidiaries that the 60 banks 
own are aggregated rather than listed separately. The bank-specific data sourced 
from Bureau van DjikÕs (2013) Bankscope database included total loans, non-
performing loans (NPLs), profit before tax, total assets, tier 1 capital, gross loans 
and loan loss provisions. All bank-specific data is in thousands of dollars to allow for 
ease of comparison. It is assumed that the data has been accurately entered into 
Bankscope. 
Macroeconomic data such as GDP per capita annual growth rate and inflation were 
sourced from the World Bank database. Any data that were missing were then 
sourced from Tradingeconomics (2013). Several countries did not have any official 
statistics for recent years. In such cases, estimates were sourced from the CIA 
ÒWorld FactbookÓ. It is assumed that data from these three sources, including the 
estimates, are accurate. The difficulty in obtaining reliable yearly GDP and inflation 
data for Lebanon and Palestine, meant banks based in the two countries had to be 
excluded from the dataset, which in turn reduced the sample size.   
The final data set achieved consists of 57 banks, including 627 bank-year 
observations, operating in 15 countries. Figure 4 below highlights that the sample is 
a fair representative because 82.5% of the banks included come from within the 
GCC, Jordan and Malaysia. This is significant as they account for 80% of the Islamic 
banking industry (IMF Survery, 2010). Even though the number of banks included 
may be considered small, it is important to note that there are far fewer Islamic 
banks than conventional banks, and many are still in the development stage. 
  
40 
Figure 4: Geographical distribution of sample 
 
The 11-year period of 2002-2012 is sufficiently long enough to capture both an 
economic upswing and a downturn. This specific time interval captures the upswing 
of the early millennium and the downturn caused by the financial crisis in 2008/09. 
Table 6 highlights that 11 out of the 16 countries included in the sample 
experienced a downturn during the global financial crisis. Only Indonesia, Jordan 
and Sudan avoided a downturn during the 11-year period. Whilst Syria and Yemen 
managed to avoid a recession, they experienced recessions in 2003 and 2011-12 
respectively. Interestingly, Indonesia, Jordan and Sudan did not experience a year 
of contraction at any point during the period, although both Jordan and Sudan 
experienced much slower growth during and post-crisis. This could be down to the 
data being manipulated by the countriesÕ respective governments to show their 
economic policies are both viable and productive. 
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Table 6: GDP growth per capita (%) 
Country Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Arab World 2.1 2.9 -0.5 2.4 
World 2.8 0.2 -3.3 2.8 
Bahrain -0.2 -1.7 -3.4 -0.5 
Indonesia 4.8 4.5 3.2 4.8 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.6 1.1 0.6 -13.7 
Iraq -1.0 4.1 3.2 3.1 
Jordan 5.8 4.9 3.2 0.1 
Kuwait -1.2 -0.8 -10.1 -1.5 
Malaysia 4.4 3.0 -3.2 5.3 
Pakistan 3.7 -0.3 1.7 1.7 
Qatar -0.9 -0.2 -2.7 4.2 
Saudi Arabia -0.1 2.4 -1.5 2.9 
Sudan 8.4 0.1 0.4 0.7 
Syrian Arab Republic 1.6 0.5 2.5 0.8 
Turkey 3.4 -0.6 -6.0 7.8 
United Arab Emirates -13.2 -11.9 -13.3 -7.3 
United Kingdom 3.0 -1.6 -4.6 1.0 
Yemen, Rep. 0.8 1.2 1.4 5.2 
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5.2. Empirical Model 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the key determinants and 
motivations behind loan loss provisions within Islamic banks. Based on the 
literature review, I hypothesise that the key determinants are a bankÕs size, tier 1 
capital, loan growth rate, non-performing loans and previous provisions (i.e. they 
dynamically provision). I also hypothesise that Islamic banks are not procyclical and 
therefore considerably more prudent in their provisioning. If any of the following 
conditions are met, then Islamic banks can be considered prudent in their 
provisioning: 
1. Loan loss provisions are positively correlated with banksÕ earnings. 
2. Loan loss provisions are positively linked to loan growth and/or non-
performing loans. 
3. Loan loss provisions are positively associated with GDP growth per capita. 
Condition one refers to the income-smoothing theory whilst condition two and three 
capture loan loss provision alignments with Òbank-specific and macroeconomic 
cyclical indicatorsÓ (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002). The banks are not considered 
procyclical if conditions 2 and 3 hold. 
In order to test whether the conditions stand or not, and to examine the 
determinants of bankÕs provisioning decisions, the model in Equation 2 is estimated. 
Equation 2: Basic fixed-effects regression model 
LLP
! !∀
! !! ! !!!
EBTP
! !∀
! !!!!!!∀ ! !!!!GDP! ! !!!!! ! !!
Size
! !∀
! !!
Tier
! !∀
! !!
NPL
! !∀
! !!! ! !!!∀ 
Where: 
!!∀
! !∀
! Loan loss provisions (LLP) over the bankÕs total assets for bank i at time t  
!∀#∃
! !∀
: Earnings before tax and loan loss provisions over the bankÕs total assets for 
bank i at time t 
!Lit: Loan growth in real terms for bank i at time t 
!GDPt: Real GDP per capita growth rate at time t 
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Tt: Year dummy Ð 1 for pre-2010, 0 otherwise 
Sizeit: Natural logarithm of Bank iÕs total loans over the bankÕs total assets at time t 
!∀#∃
! !∀
: Tier 1 capital over the bankÕs total assets for bank i at time t  
!∀#
! !∀
: Non-performing loans over the bankÕs total assets for bank i at time t 
!!! Measures the bank-specific coefficient 
!!∀! Error term 
The dependent variable in Equation 2 is the level of loan loss provisions scaled by 
total assets to avoid the potential problem of heteroskedasticity. Total bank assets 
also scaled EBTP, size and tier. A bankÕs size can be measured in various ways such 
as total loans outstanding, equity market value or total assets. Managerial 
discretion is largely dependent on the magnitude of outstanding loans; it is the 
most suited size proxy for this study (Kanagaretnam et al, 2003). The empirical 
specification used here closely follows the models used in the literature to test the 
income-smoothing hypothesis (see Laeven and Majnoni, 2002 and Greenawalt & 
Sinkey, 1988). 
The model is estimated using bank-specific fixed effects due to the Hausman 
specification test hypothesis (H0) being rejected, validating it over the random 
effects model. This identifies the fixed effects estimator as being consistent and 
more efficient. Under the fixed effects regression, the individual bank effects are 
assumed to be correlated with the regressors and therefore not constant. If we 
interpret the bank-specific effects as reflecting the banksÕ own business strategies 
and their regulatory environment, then it is clear that these can differ between 
banks and countries. Therefore, it can be argued that these are likely to be 
correlated with the bankÕs ability to make new loans and grow their loan pool at 
faster rates, their tier 1 capital, the countryÕs GDP and the bankÕs size.  
The critical explanatory variable being tested is the banksÕ earnings. The proxy used 
is earnings before tax and provisions, which is used by several previous empirical 
literature such as Laeven and Majnoni (2002), Taktak et al (2010) and Farook et al 
(2010). Bank risk is accounted for via loan growth and non-performing loans which 
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measure credit growth, and GDP per capita, which controls for the economic cycle. 
Higher levels of loan growth is associated with lower monitoring efforts, whilst non-
performing loans measure the quality of the loan portfolio. The economic cycle is 
important as booms tend to reduce credit risk, whereas downturns have the 
opposite effect as more loans are defaulted on. 
Prior research found conflicting results with regards to the relationship between the 
critical explanatory variable and loan loss provisions. Under the income-smoothing 
hypothesis, the relationship should be positive as suggested by Collins et al (1995), 
Ahmed et al (1999) and Beatty et al (1995). Tier 1 capital has been included to 
control for discreationary loan loss provisions in the form of capital management. 
The inclusion of a time dummy allows the model to capture time-specific effects, 
such as changes in regulation and impacts from the financial crisis.  A separate test 
will include a negative earnings dummy (1 for negative earnings, 0 otherwise) 
interacted with the EBTP/Assets to determine whether negative earnings have an 
impact on how provisions are handled.   
A second alternative model to test the 3 conditions and the determinants behind 
loan loss provisions is depicted by Equation 3 whereby a dynamic model of loan loss 
provisions is used by introducing two lags of the dependent variable. 
Equation 3: Arellano-Bond GMM Dynamic model of loan loss provisions 
LLP
! !∀
! !! ! !!!
LLP
! !!!!!
! !!
LLP
! !!!!!
! !!!
EBTP
! !∀
! !!!!!!∀ ! !!!!GDP! ! !!
Size
! !∀
! !!
Tier
! !∀
! !!!
NPL
! !∀
! !!!! ! !!!∀ 
The dependent variableÕs lagged values Òcaptures the speed of adjustment of loan 
loss provisions to an equilibrium levelÓ (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002). This model 
better captures the potential impact of total bank assets on loan loss provisions 
through the lagged values, reducing potential problems of omitted variables. 
Moreover, it increases focus on the effects of the flow variables on loan loss 
provisioning (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002). The first and second lags will take into 
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account the speed of provision adjustments within the first year and beyond the 
first year.  
The inclusion of lags of the dependent variables renders OLS estimations for 
Equation 3 inconsistent, hence the Arellano-Bond estimator will be used. It allows 
the model to achieve consistent estimates for our model and as Mileva (2007) 
explains, this Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) difference estimator is 
designed to handle panel data with a short time horizon (11 years) and a larger set 
of banks (57). Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond estimator resolves the problems 
raised by the presence of individual unobserved bank effects (vi). It gives 
consistent estimates under the assumption that the error term is not serially 
correlated and the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. Under these 
assumptions, lags of the dependent variable are valid instruments and the GMM 
estimator is efficient.  
To assess whether these assumptions are indeed valid, a test of second-order serial 
autocorrelation of the error term must be considered. The results of the test, shown 
in Table 7, conclude that the hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected, 
and therefore the assumptions are valid. If this were not the case, then the GMM 
difference estimator would not be valid. Additionally, the Sargan test confirms there 
is an absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term in my 
model as the null hypothesis of Ôover identifying restrictions are validÕ cannot be 
rejected. 
Table 7: Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors  
Order z Prob > z 
1 -1.517 0.1293 
2 1.4125 0.1578 
 
The key results of interest in our analysis are the coefficients on EBTP, GDP, change 
in gross loans and tier one capital (!!! !!! !!!and!!!). In order to establish whether 
banks are prudent in their provisioning, the results must reveal a positive 
coefficient for earnings before tax and provisions, loan growth, GDP growth and 
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non-performing loans. If this were not the case, then my hypothesis that Islamic 
banks are prudent in their provisioning would be rejected. 
Table 8: Coefficient sign implications  
Coefficient 
Positive result 
inference 
Negative result 
inference 
!! Income-smoothing No income-smoothing 
!! Prudent provisioning Imprudent provisioning 
!! Not procyclical Procyclical 
!! 
(Not included in dynamic 
model) 
Provisioning has 
decreased post-2010 
Provisioning has increased 
post-2010 
!! 
Bigger banks provision 
more 
Bigger banks provision 
less 
!! 
Rejects use of LLP for 
capital management 
Confirms use of LLP for 
capital management 
!! Prudent provisioning Imprudent provisioning 
 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are focal in the second model as 
they will identify whether or not Islamic banks adjust their loan loss provisions 
quickly. A significant !! or !! would reveal the banks are slow in adjusting the 
provisions over a multiyear horizon and would confirm that a dynamic model is 
applicable. 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 reveals the bank-year distribution of the sample used across the 11-year 
period by country. The countries with the most representation are Bahrain, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates and Iran, which is appropriate given the GCCÕs dominance in 
Islamic Banking. 
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Table 9: Distribution of bank-year observations by country 
Country Frequency Percentage 
Bahrain 143 22.81 
Indonesia 11 1.75 
Iran 66 10.53 
Jordan 22 3.51 
Kuwait 77 12.28 
Malaysia 33 5.26 
Pakistan 22 3.51 
Qatar 22 3.51 
Saudi Arabia 22 3.51 
Sudan 44 7.02 
Syria 22 3.51 
Turkey 22 3.51 
United Arab Emirates 88 14.04 
United Kingdom 22 3.51 
Yemen 11 1.75 
Total 627 100 
 
 Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of 
Equation 2. The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets equals 0.64% on 
average, with a maximum of 10.3% and a standard deviation of 1.35%. These 
results are similar to Taktak et al (2010) who reported an average of 0.54%. 
Further, Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) found that GCC bankÕs allocate on average 
only 1.31% and explained that this implies that they Òmake a very low estimate of 
loss provisionsÓ. The average earnings before taxes and provisions to total assets is 
1.96%, compared to Taktak et alÕs (2010) 2.29% and Zoubi and Al-KhazaliÕs (2007) 
2.23%, with a maximum of 26.1%. On average, the natural logarithm of banksÕ 
size is 13.62% with low dispersion from the mean, highlighted by the low standard 
deviation of 2.19%. 
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 Table 10: Summary Statistics where total assets scale LLP, EBTP, NPL and tier 1 capital. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LLP 314 0.0064709 0.0135 -0.126497 0.1032746 
EBTP 382 0.0195584 0.0548 
-
0.4108263 
0.2611041 
Loan Growth 331 33.2081 84.9111 -100 764.84 
Non-performing 
loans 
297 0.0254064 0.0418 0 0.4414414 
ln(Size) 367 13.61979 2.1888 6.428519 17.64261 
Tier 1 Capital 182 0.2214303 0.2086 0.0000896 1.021244 
 
The average loan growth in the sample is 33.2%, indicating Islamic bankingÕs rapid 
growth over the period of 2002-2012.  It is important to note that the average loan 
growth has not been filtered out, unlike previous studies on loan loss provisions, 
such as Laeven and Majnoni (2002). The result is a relatively high standard 
deviation which indicates large dispersion in the loan growth rates. This decision is 
approriate given the fact that Islamic banks have witnessed tremendous growth 
over the last decade with certain banks growing at much faster rates than others. 
Removing the banks with extreme growth may negatively impact the overall 
results. Figure 5 highlights the rapid growth of Islamic banking over the last decade 
and the impacts of the financial crisis during 2008/09. Notably, Islamic banks have 
yet to resume the growth rates they were achieving pre-crisis, despite continuing to 
outperform conventional banks.  
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Figure 5: Average growth rate of gross loans for Islamic banks included in the sample 
 
Figure 6 accentuates the impact of the financial crisis as it hit earnings heavily with 
the banks having to, on average, increase their loan loss provisions to cover the 
increase in non-performing loans. The banksÕ earnings have yet to recover to pre-
crisis levels even 3 years on. In addition, both non-performing loans and provisions 
still remain above the average level they were at before 2008. The negative 
earnings dummy, which will provide insight into how the banks managed their 
provisions during periods of negative earnings, will be of critical interest. 
Figure 6: Average Loan loss provisions, earnings before tax and provisions and non-
performing loans (all scaled by total assets). 
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Table 11 indicates that LLPÕs correlation with EBTP and GDP are both negative and 
statistically significant. The correlation between loan loss provisions and EBTP is 
approximately negative 26%, suggesting that the on average banks do not exercise 
income-smoothing. Prior studies on Islamic banks have also shown negative 
significant correlation at 5% for EBPT such as Taktak et al (2010) and Farook et al 
(2010). Likewise, Taktak et al (2010) found GDP to have a significant negative 
correlation with loan loss provisions for Islamic banks while Farook et al (2010) 
found it to have an insigificant correlation. 
Table 11: Correlation Matrix (asterisks mark significance at the 5% level) 
 
LLP EBTP 
GDP 
Growth 
Loan 
Growth 
Non-
performing 
loans 
ln(Size) 
Tier 1 
Capital 
LLP 1 
      
EBTP -0.261* 1 
     
GDP Growth -0.143* 0.073 1 
    
Loan Growth 0.053 0.062 -0.120* 1 
   
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.067 -0.024 0.116* -0.103 1 
  
ln(Size) 0.015 0.154* -0.135* 0.012 -0.131* 1 
 
Tier 1 Capital -0.049 -0.141 0.058 0.028 0.079 -0.581* 1 
 
Laeven and Majnoni (2002), Kanagaretnam et al (2003) and Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) all found earnings to be positively significant for conventional 
banks worldwide suggesting they tended to income-smooth. In addition, the former 
two found GDP to be negatively correlated and significant (Kanagaretnam et al did 
not include GDP in their tests). Prominently however, the GDP coefficients for 
conventional banks appear to be relatively far larger than for Islamic banks. The 
negative correlation between loan loss provisions and GDP growth suggests 
procyclical behaviour as it indicates they increase their loan loss provisions when 
the economy shrinks. It is important to note that the correlation between GDP and 
earnings might cause a multicollinearity problem in the econometric analysis. This 
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does not appear to be a problem for this sample as the correlations are not 
exceedingly high. 
Moreover, Table 11 suggests prudent behaviour by the average bank due to the 
positive correlation with loan growth and non-performing loans. However, both are 
not significant even at the 10% level, therefore cannot confirm whether they 
dynamically provision or not.  Farook et al (2010) and Taktak et al (2010) found 
similar results with regards to loan growth and non-performing loans for their 
samples of Islamic banks. Kanagaretnam et alÕs (2003) non-performing loans and 
change in loans coefficients mirrored the results seen in Table 11. Interestingly, 
when combining Islamic banks with conventional banks, Farook et alÕs  (2010) loan 
growth variable becomes significant and negatively correlated with loan loss 
provisions at the 1% significance level, achieving comparable results to Fonseca 
and GonzlezÕs (2008) cross-country study of conventional banks. A negative 
coefficient for non-performing loans and loan growth implies imprudent behaviour 
by the banks since they are not increasing their provisions in line with the building 
up of credit risk. 
Both the size and tier 1 capital variables are insignificant. Packer and Zhu (2012) 
found similar results for conventional banks however, prior studies on Islamic banks 
have found positive significant correlations between size and loan loss provisions, 
such as Farook et al (2010) and Taktak et al (2010). With regards to the correlation 
between capital and loan loss provisions, Taktak et al (2010) found a negative 
sigificant correlation. Seperately, testing the correlation between provisions and the 
natural logarithm of total assets (a popular size proxy in other academic work) lead 
to the same outcome where size was insignificant. 
5.4. Limitations 
The data and methodology presented has several limitations that must be 
highlighted as they may impact the overall results. Firstly, the sample size can be 
considered a constraint; however, considering the industryÕs relatively small size 
and given the fair representation in the sample, the impact should be minor. 
Secondly, the time period covered only represents 11 years. The results achieved 
may change if this period was extended further into the past, although it is evident 
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that the industry has grown and developed extensively over the last decade. For 
this reason, and the scarce historical data available for years further back, the 
decision was made to limit the sample to 11 years to ensure accuracy and 
relevancy in the outcomes. Thirdly, the fact that the empirical analysis is 
completely reliant on quantitative data and does not involve any qualitative 
aspects, such as interviewing Islamic bank managers, can be seen as a limitation. 
Likewise, the use of conventional banking journalsÕ results, rather than running 
separate empirical tests on conventional banks to compare the two banking types, 
is a drawback. However, given the scope of this dissertation, utilising existing 
conventional banking research and quantitative models can provide a solid 
understanding behind the determinants of loan loss provisions and how they 
compare and contrast to conventional banks. Finally, as with all empirical tests, 
they come with their own limitations and they can only be as accurate as the data 
set being utilised. Examples include GDP and inflation which may be politically 
influenced to avoid financial distress or avoid political damage. Unfortunately, this 
final limitation cannot be overcome. 
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6. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis is split into 4 parts. First, the findings are highlighted. 
Second, the findings are analysed. Subsequently, the findings are compared to 
previous loan loss provision research, which focused on Islamic banking, followed 
by the final section that compares the findings to existing studies on conventional 
banks. 
6.1. Findings 
Table 12 presents the regressions results for the first model (Equation 2 on page 
42), controlling for individual bank-specific effects, such as their own specific 
business strategies, institutional frameworks, and external regulatory, tax, 
accounting and legal environments. The results show the variables loan growth; 
size and tier 1 capital have a significant negative relationship with loan loss 
provisions. The year dummy is found to be insignificant. 
Table 12:  Basic regression with fixed effects. A constant is included but not reported.  
 
Coefficient P>|t| 
EBTP/Assets -0.0478 0.2090 
Loan Growth (%) -0.00005 0.0280** 
GDP Per Capita -0.0001 0.8000 
Ln(Size) -0.0213 0.0000*** 
NPL/Assets -0.0961 0.4380 
Tier 1 Capital/Assets -0.0767 0.0630* 
Year Dummy 0.0030 0.4890 
R2 0.008 
Hausman test  
(Prob>chi2 value) 
0.0018*** 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 
10%. 
A bankÕs size is significant at the 1% level in determining loan loss provisions. The 
coefficient indicates that for a 1% rise in a banksÕ size, loan loss provisions (scaled 
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by assets) fall by 0.000213 (0.0213/100) units, ceteris paribus. This suggests that 
bigger banks make fewer provisions. 
7. The tier 1 capital variable has a coefficient of -0.0767. It 
standard deviation increase in tier 1 capital, the dependent 
(see  Table 17: Central Bank of QatarÕs loan classifications and provision requirements  
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Loans that are 90-
180 days past due. 
0 
Doubtful loans 
Loans that are 180-
360 days past due. 
25 
Bad 
Loans that are over 
360 days past due. 
70 
 
Table 18: MalaysiaÕs Central Bank loan classifications  
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Loans that are 90-
180 days past due. 
20 
Doubtful loans 
Loans that are 180-
365 days past due. 
50 
Bad 
Loans that are over 
365 days past due. 
100 
 
Appendix note 1), ceteris paribus. The loan growth has a coefficient of -0.00005, 
indicating a 1 standard deviation increase in loan growth results in loan loss 
provisions falling by 0.00426%, ceteris paribus. 
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To allow for an asymmetric pattern of loan loss provisions during periods of both 
positive and negative earnings, Table 13 includes the earnings variable interacted 
with a negative dummy variable.  The results reveal an insignificant coefficient for 
the dummy variable. Earnings before tax and provisions are now slightly significant 
at the 10% level. This signifies that for a 1 standard deviation increase in earnings, 
loan loss provisions fall by 0.0144%. 
Table 13:  Basic regression with fixed effects. A constant is included but not reported.  
 
Coefficient P>|t| 
EBTP/Assets -0.2631 0.096* 
Loan Growth -0.00004 0.039** 
GDP Per Capita -0.0002 0.671 
Ln(Size) -0.0247 0.000*** 
Non-performing Loans/Assets -0.0549 0.665 
Tier 1 Capital/Assets -0.0758 0.063* 
Year Dummy -0.004 0.443 
Negative Earnings Dummy * EBTP/Assets 0.3074 0.143 
Note: Negative earnings dummy (negative earnings*EBTP) multiplied by the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term implies a negative effect on provisions. 
Table 14 presents the results for the dynamic model (Equation 3). The first lag is 
revealed to be significant unlike the second lag. As with the previous model, tier 1 
capital remains significant (now at the 1% level) with the coefficient remaining 
consistent. More importantly, the loss of a significant number of observations due 
to the inclusion of 2 lags of the dependent variable in the model does not appear to 
have heavily impacted the estimation results. This is highlighted by the similarities 
between the GMM model findings and the previous regressions, providing a good 
test of robustness of the results. The GMM regression does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, which in turn increases the confidence in these 
results. 
Table 14: GMM regression with 2 lags of the dependent variable. Constant is included in the 
model but not reported. 
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Coefficient P>|z| 
1st LLP/Assets Lag -0.6163 0.015** 
2nd LLP/Assets Lag -0.2149 0.348 
EBTP/Assets 0.0252 0.418 
Loan Growth -0.00001 0.538 
GDP Per Capita -0.0003 0.141 
Size -0.001 0.729 
Non-performing Loans/Assets 0.1509 0.036** 
Tier 1 Capital/Assets 0.0675 0.007*** 
Test for autocorrelation of order 2 0.254 
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Table 15 re-introduces the negative earnings dummy variable. The dummy variable 
remains insignificant at the crucial 1% and 5% levels, reinforcing the previous 
findings, especially given the earnings variable is now significant at the 5% level. 
The EBTP coefficient is now seen to be positive and significant at 5%. 
Table 15: GMM regression including 2 lags of the dependent variable and a negative 
earnings dummy interacted with EBTP/Assets. Constant included but not reported. 
 
Coefficient P>|z| 
1st Lag -0.5981 0.015** 
2nd Lag -0.2026 0.365 
EBTP/Assets 0.1572 0.03** 
Loan Growth 0.0000 0.497 
GDP Per Capita -0.0003 0.101 
Size 0.0018 0.552 
Non-performing Loans/Assets 0.1575 0.025** 
Tier 1 Capital/Assets 0.0775 0.002*** 
Negative Earnings Dummy * EBTP/Assets -0.1928 0.064* 
 
Table 16 presents the results of the Wald test for each GMM regression. The p-
values are all less than the generally used criterion of 0.05, enabling the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of the test. This indicates that the coefficients are not 
simultaneously equal to zero, concluding that incorporating all these variables 
produces a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. 
Table 16: Wald test results for the GMM regressions.  
GMM test Chi Prob>Chi 
2 lags 19.54 0.012 
2 lags EBTP with negative 
earnings dummy 
23.00 0.010 
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7.1. Analysis 
The income-smoothing proposition was not supported by either standard model as 
they both found the earnings before tax and provisions scaled by total assets as an 
insignificant factor. This suggests that the banks do not use loan loss provisions to 
smooth their earnings. The models including the negative earnings dummy (Table 
13 and Table 15) add some depth to the analysis as they provide an asymmetric 
pattern of loan loss provisions. The results suggest that the banks do not make 
statistically significant changes to their provisions when they incur negative 
earnings, compared to when they generate a positive level of earnings. The banks 
do not use up their capital during difficult periods to make provisions, signifying 
that the banks on average make enough provisions during the good times to cover 
the bad times. The positive sign on EBTP in Table 15 could suggest the banks 
withdraw from their statistical funds to cover any losses. This further supports the 
notion that the banks do not intensify economic downturns, possibly explaining why 
Islamic countriesÕ growth has not been heavily impacted by the crisis.  
Moreover, including the dummy into the regression has consistently rendered 
earnings before tax and provisions significant, suggesting Islamic banks are more 
likely to income-smooth when the banks report negative earnings rather than when 
they report positive earnings is seen as a countercyclical. This has an important 
implication for Islamic banks as they rely on profit and sharing accounts to attract 
depositors. If the banks report heavy losses, then it means the depositors of these 
accounts will also suffer a loss. Consequently, the bank managers are pressured 
into interfering by smoothing the earnings to avoid large losses that would 
otherwise have to be passed on. Passing large losses onto the depositor base could 
push away customers, and more importantly, negatively impact the reputation of 
Islamic banks. The conflicting signs between the two models is an area worth 
researching further as earnings are clearly an important determinant considering 
the large coefficient. 
The loan growth rate, significant at 5% in the fixed effects regression, has an 
undesirable negative coefficient that implies that banks have been imprudent 
during periods of rapid credit growth. More importantly however the coefficient is 
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extremely small and can be considered negligible. The negligible impact is 
confirmed by the variable not being significant at all in the dynamic model.  
The regression also reports a negative coefficient for tier 1 capital significant at 
10%, suggesting that loan loss provisions are used to reduce expected regulatory 
costs associated with violating capital requirements (Ahmed et al, 1999). On the 
other hand, the GMM regression reports a positive significant relationship between 
tier 1 capital and loan loss provisions, indicating Islamic banks do not use 
provisions for capital management. Critically, the tier 1 capital is significant (at 1%) 
in the dynamic model suggesting more emphasis should be given to this particular 
result. Undoubtedly, capital is an important determinant of loan loss provisions in 
both models and the conflicting results may be an area worth exploring further in 
future research.  
The GMM regression displays a significant positive relationship between non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions, unlike the insignificant result in the basic 
regression. Thus, the more overdue loans a bank has, the more it sets aside in 
provisions to cover the potential losses. This is what was expected based on 
previous literature and confirms it is an essential determinant because an increase 
in credit risk, due to higher non-performing loans, has a positive influence on loan 
loss provisions (Taktak et al, 2010, Misman and Ahmad, 2011). A positive 
coefficient for non-performing suggests Islamic bank managers are being prudent 
by protecting themselves from increases in credit and default risk by increasing 
provisions. They are therefore managing their risks appropriately, as an Islamic 
based institution would be required to do. Furthermore, the fact that both GDP and 
loan growth are insignificant, or at the very least minimal, refutes the idea Islamic 
banks are procyclical and supports the notion they behave prudently. 
The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable in the GMM regressions is 
negative and statistically significant, revealing that a dynamic specification model 
for provisioning is recommended. The implication is provisions are systematically 
related in each period. The negative sign could suggest Islamic banks over 
provision for loans and then reduce the provisions as payments for those loans are 
made and the risks are better assessed during the first year, acting as a 
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countercyclical tool. Prez et al (2011) found that when banks are offered a 
Òtransparent smoothing mechanism they stop smoothing profits in a non-
transparent wayÓ, which is consistent with the results found in this paper as the 
banks were not seen to income-smooth, yet they are known to dynamically 
provision as required by the AAOIFI. 
To summarise the findings and analysis, the main determinants of loan loss 
provisions are found to be tier 1 capital, non-performing loans and size. The banks 
are evidently prudent and are not procyclical. The results reveal that the banks only 
income-smooth when they suffer negative earnings, acting as a countercyclical tool. 
7.2. Comparisons to Existing Islamic Banking Research 
The earnings before tax and provision results confirm those found by Ismail and 
Lay (2002), Abdul Rahman and Abdullah (2005) and Taktak et al (2010). They 
found that managers of Islamic banks practiced less earnings management than 
conventional banks. Quttainah et al (2011) adds that laws of Shariah Òdiscourage 
opportunistic behaviors, which prevent Muslim managers in Islamic banks to 
practice earnings managementÓ. This is contrary to discoveries made by Zoubi and 
Al-Khazali (2007) and Farook et al (2010) who found that Islamic banks increased 
their provisions as earnings improved, confirming the income-smoothing 
hypothesis. The findings obtained in this study suggest that Islamic bank managers 
are under less pressure to force smooth earnings due to the very different 
ownership structure of the banks. Unlike their conventional counterparts, Islamic 
banks, especially in the GCC, are owned by ultra-high net worth individuals, large 
institutions, ruling families and their national governments. This reduces the 
pressure on managers to consistently deliver larger profits as these institutions and 
individuals can diversify their portfolio and tend to hold positions for much longer. 
They are therefore not as heavily impacted by short-term fluctuations of a bankÕs 
share price but rather more interested in the longer term performance. Quttainah 
et al (2011) adds that Islamic bank managers Òfocus not only on the maximisation 
of shareholders value, they are responsible to improve and assist in the socio-
economic development of societiesÒ. 
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Islamic bankÕs naturally have more stable earnings due to their profit and sharing 
principle, whereby banks ÔinvestÕ in their clients rather than simply provide them 
with loans and leave them to deal with the risks. Furthermore, Islamic banks are 
encouraged to acquire physical assets on their own, preventing them from over 
extending their credit and, as such, their profitability. Conventional banks on the 
other hand Òexcessively [use] the credit and debt financing, which can lead to more 
financial risksÓ and can lead to higher earnings volatility (Taktak et al, 2010). 
From the basic regression results (Table 12 and Table 13), the capital variable is 
the only significant independent variable that is consistent with other existing 
literature on Islamic banks (Farook et al, 2010, Taktak et al, 2010). Farook et alÕs 
study found loan growth to be an insignificant determinant, which was similar to 
the dynamic model results. This highlights Islamic bankingÕs more risk-averse 
approach to lending and prudent behaviour towards their high loan growth rates 
compared to their conventional counterparts. Previous research on Islamic banks 
revealed a positive (rather than negative) relationship between loan loss provisions 
and a bankÕs size (Othman and Mersni, 2012, Farook et al, 2010). The main reason 
for this difference is that they tended to use the natural logarithm of total assets 
rather than natural logarithm of total loans. Separately running the regression 
using total assets rather than total loans produces a positive coefficient, although 
the variable is no longer significant. 
Both models confirm Farook et al (2010) and Taktak et alÕs (2010) results who 
found GDP to be an insigificant determinant for loan loss provisions in Islamic 
banks. This verifies that Islamic banks are not procyclical, which is economically 
significant and explains why so much attention has been given to Islamic banks 
since the financial crisis. 
7.3. Comparisons to Existing Conventional Banking Research  
The earnings before tax and provisions variable is seen as a critical determinant for 
conventional banking provisions. A range of literature finds earnings have a positive 
significant relationship with loan loss provisions due to manager incentives to 
income-smooth (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002, Laeven and Majnoni, 2003, 
Kanagaretnam et al, 2003, Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005, Bouvatier and Leptit, 
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2008, Davis and Zhu, 2009, Packer and Zhu, 2012). Islamic banking managers 
clearly face different pressures and incentives to their conventional counterparts 
since earnings are found to be an insignificant determinant. Laeven and MajnoniÕs 
(2002) study found conventional banks made Òstatistically significantly higher 
provisionsÓ when they incurred losses than when they generated positive earnings, 
highlighting that they do not make enough provisions during good times to cover 
more difficult microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions.  
In comparison to the results in Table 12, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found 
conventional banks have a much larger negative coefficient for loan growth. They 
reported a coefficient of -0.158 significant at 5%, compared to my coefficient of -
0.00005. This demonstrates the difference in the level of imprudent behaviour by 
the banks during periods of rapid loan growth. A negative coefficient implies the 
banks reduce their provisions as they grow their loan portfolio.  Islamic banks, by 
their very nature, are setup to be less risky due to the way they conduct business. 
To further emphasis their different approach to provisioning, Farook et alÕs (2010) 
study found loan growth to be an insignificant determinant for Islamic banks, 
whereas it was negatively significant (coefficient of 0.01) for the regression that 
involved conventional banks. Supporting Farook et alÕs (2010) results, other studies 
that included loan growth as part of their model ended up with a negative 
significant coefficient for loan growth (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002, Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003, Craig et al, 2006, Davis and Zhu, 2009, Packer and Zhu, 2012). For 
non-performing loans, the studies found that conventional banks tend to have a 
positive significant relationship, similar to Islamic banks. The higher the number of 
non-performing loans, the more provisions the banks made. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that most Islamic banks are still considered small to medium 
sized and are growing an average of 33% a year in the selected sample, which may 
explain their emphasis on being cautious. In addition, given their recent entry and 
expansion into various banking activities, both national and international regulators 
are paying extra attention and scrutiny to their performances.  
In Packer and ZhuÕs (2012) study on conventional banks in Asia, they attained an 
insignificant bank size variable (which uses loan to assets ratio). Bikker and 
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MetzemakersÕ (2005) study found a positive significant coefficient for banks in the 
United States, Italy and Spain, but a negative significant coefficient for banks in 
Japan, suggesting an uncommon regulatory stance towards bank size. It seems 
regulators do not agree on how bigger banks should manage their provisions. Some 
countries seem to require them to hold more provisions whilst others allow them to 
hold fewer provisions given their size. The results for the Islamic banks in this 
sample suggest the banks with more total loans get away with holding fewer 
provisions. Islamic regulators may allow this due to the prudent behaviour with 
regards to the way Islamic bank managers handle loan growth and non-performing 
loans. Additionally, Islamic banks are required to hold physical assets against many 
of their loans, which reduces the overall risk as these assets (such as the houses or 
cars for mortgage and car loans respectively) can be sold to raise capital if the 
borrower were to default.  
According to a large set of existing literature on conventional banks around the 
globe, a negative relationship between capital and loan loss provisions was found, 
supporting the use of loan loss provisions for capital management (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005, Craig et al, 2006, Bouvatier and Leptit, 2008, Packer and Zhu, 
2012). According to the outcomes from the two models, Islamic banks do not use 
loan loss provisions for the purposes of capital management, which sets them apart 
from their non-Islamic counterparts. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2002) reported a significant GDP coefficient of -0.077 for their 
sample. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found the same to be true for his sample 
of American, European and Asian banks. Further, Packer and Zhu (2012) confirmed 
their results for banks in Asia. This proposes that conventional banks raise their 
provisions during economic downturns. They therefore exacerbate downturns as 
they pull capital from the economy to cover potential loan losses by raising 
provisions significantly. U.S. banks, for example, were found to have a coefficient of 
0.299 (Laeven and Majnoni, 2002), which shows the strength of the procyclical 
nature of banks in the country. This is very different to Islamic banks where GDP 
growth was found to be an insignificant determinant for loan loss provisions, 
confirming that Islamic banks fare better during economic downturns. Conventional 
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banks are consequently more heavily impacted by the financial strength of firms, 
households and the overall economy suggesting they focus less on the long term 
macroeconomic view in their risk management. 
With regards to the lagged dependent variables, Packer and Zhu (2012) found it to 
be positively significant for banks in China, India and Southeast Asia suggesting Òa 
certain degree of persistency in the time series of loan loss provisionsÓ. Japan was 
found to have an insignificant lagged coefficient, meaning a relationship does not 
exist between one period of provisions and the previous period. Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) found that both Japanese banks and banks in Luxembourg did 
not dynamically provision either. A positive coefficient implies that conventional 
banks do not make enough provisions at the start and slowly add to their provisions 
as they recognize losses following a default event.  
Laeven and Majnoni (2002) confirm that the 1,419 conventional banks in 45 
countries are Òslow in adjustingÓ their provisions to their optimal level over a 
multiyear horizon as both the first and second lags were found to be positively 
statistically significant. Table 14 and Table 15 highlight that Islamic banks are not 
as slow as conventional banks in reaching this optimal level as only the first lag is 
significant, which is economically substantial as it means they are able to correct 
their level of provisions at a faster pace. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper set out to critically evaluate and ascertain the determinants behind loan 
loss provisions specifically for Islamic banks, and to then compare them to the 
determinants of loan loss provisions for conventional banks, as found by existing 
literature. This paper sought to analyse the reasons for the differences between the 
two types of banks in terms of their provisioning by taking into account the varying 
business objectives and methods. The unique foundations of Islamic banks, and the 
fact they have avoided the financial unrest largely unscathed compared to many 
conventional banks around the globe, has brought about renewed attention and 
interest into the way they conduct business.  
The literature review has found a large range of possible determinants for various 
time periods, both before and after Basel I and Basel II. The first determinant, 
income-smoothing, was found to be one of the most significant factors. Managers 
were seen to be subject to large reputational and regulatory pressures to ensure 
smooth bank earnings. Furthermore, Islamic bank managers were seen to face an 
additional pressure to smooth earnings to ensure depositors were not impacted by 
heavy volatility in earnings considering both losses and profits were shared. A 
second important determinant was capital. The use of loan loss provisions to 
manage capital was seen a valuable tool that both Islamic and conventional banks 
made use of. In addition, two final determinants were discovered that played a vital 
role in provisioning, which were the macroeconomic conditions and credit risk. A 
large set of literature considered conventional banks to be imprudent and 
procyclical, exacerbating economic downturns. On the other hand, the Islamic 
banks were found to be prudent and not as heavily impacted by the economic 
environment, explaining how and why they largely avoided the financial unrest. It is 
essential to note that there are contrasting views and results for each determinant, 
with varying implications based on their findings. 
The sample used in this paper consisted of an unbalanced panel of 57 Islamic banks 
operating in 15 countries, with 82.5% coming from the GCC, Jordan and Malaysia. 
Two main regression models were used. The first, a basic OLS regression with fixed 
effects included 7 independent variables. These are earnings before tax and 
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provisions, loan growth, GDP per capita growth rates, size, non-performing loans 
and a year dummy. The year dummy was included in order to establish whether or 
not Basel II and various other regulator enhancements have had an effect on the 
determinants of loan loss provisions since the financial crisis. The second, a GMM 
Arellano-Bond regression included 2 lags of the independent variable. In addition, a 
separate regression was run for both the OLS and the GMM models, including a 
negative earnings dummy interacted with the earnings variables, in order to 
ascertain if the behaviour of provisioning changed during periods consisting 
exclusively of negative earnings. 
The empirical analysis reinforced some of the literature on Islamic banking while 
simultaneously discovering distinctions to the conventional banking literature. The 
results suggest Islamic banks only income-smooth during periods of negative 
earnings, as depicted by the significant earnings before tax and provisions 
coefficient when a negative earnings dummy was included. The dummy variable 
highlighted Islamic banks in general do not make statistically significant changes to 
their provisions even if they smooth their income during such periods, emphasising 
their prudent and cautious approach to provisioning. This is not the case with 
conventional banks; they make significant alterations to their provisions during 
periods of negative earnings, as reported by Laeven and Majnoni (2002).  
The GMM regressions found tier 1 capital to have a significant coefficient although 
the direction was inconsistent between the two models. The first lag of the 
dependent variable was found to be significant suggesting a dynamic model is 
recommended and the banks take a year at most to reach their optimal level of 
provisions, compared to conventional banks that take at least 1 year (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2002, Packer and Zhu, 2012). Non-performing loans were seen to be 
significant in the regressions that involved the dependent variable lags, which was 
expected considering economic and theoretical intuition, implying credit risk is a 
critical determinant. In addition, loan growth and GDP were found to have 
negligible coefficients, suggesting Islamic banks are, at most, only minimally 
procyclical and underpin the banksÕ prudent behaviour thus setting them apart from 
their conventional counterparts and ensuring they do not cause a drag on the 
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economy. This could partly explain why the growth in Islamic countries has been 
able to recover much more quickly than the western world where many banks have 
been deleveraging and writing off large losses.  
Overall, the research concludes the key determinants of loan loss provisions for 
Islamic banks are tier 1 capital, non-performing loans and size. The banks evidently 
are not procyclical and appear to provision prudently. The results prove that the 
banks avoid income-smoothing except when they suffer negative earnings, possibly 
to protect PLS accounts. Interestingly, provisioning behaviour does not appear to 
have changed significantly over the last decade as established by the insignificant 
time dummy. The implications of the findings are that Islamic banks are not a drag 
on the economy, at the very least relative to conventional banks, during downturns. 
This dissertation has contributed to existing research in Islamic banking loan loss 
provisions by finding the vital determinants and exploring the distinctions between 
Islamic banking and conventional banking provisioning methods and behaviour. The 
research has shown why Islamic banks have had such extraordinary growth during 
the last decade, considering the banks appear to be far less procyclical and far less 
damaging to the overall economy during economic downturns. Islamic banks 
appear to be more prudent than their counterparts and this is emphasised by the 
way they have dealt with the rapid increase in their assets and the way they have 
managed their credit risks. This paper is unique in the sense it has focused on 
Islamic banking loan loss provisions during the period 2002-2012 using extensive 
empirical models and methodology that has not been tested before. The research 
has increased the academic understanding of their provisioning behaviour and the 
possible managerial incentives and pressures behind their decisions. 
The limitations of the methodology and research start with the sample size. 
Although there are far fewer Islamic banks than conventional banks, a sample 
bigger than 57 banks would provide more confidence to the results and would 
portray the bigger picture in the industry. Notably, the industry is still developing 
and many of the banks have only recently begun to publically release frequent and 
reliable annual data. Considering the industryÕs growth and the fact it is still in the 
process of maturing, the banksÕ behaviour may change as their regulatory 
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framework and their business develops. Furthermore, this paper is limited by the 
fact that it does not perform any direct quantitative tests on conventional banks 
and instead relies on the substantial literature that exists.  
Noticeably, this research is constrained by the fact it relies solely on quantitative 
data; it does not conduct any qualitative research, such as interviewing the bank 
managerÕs to get a deeper insight into their provisioning conduct.  Moreover, 
political interference was assumed to be non-existent when analysing the various 
data sets. GDP statistics, for example, could be influenced by the governments to 
achieve various political objectives. Another limitation regarding the data set is that 
there are currently only 3 years of statistics post-financial crisis and post Basel II 
compliance; therefore their impact on provisioning may not yet be fully noticed.  
The final set of limitations is related to the models used. Including further 
independent variables or different proxies for the various variables, such as credit 
risk and capital management, may reveal further determinants or may reduce the 
significance of certain determinants. For example, using unemployment rates 
instead of GDP growth per capita may highlight a more prominent relationship 
between the macroeconomic environment and loan loss provisions and is an area 
worth exploring in future research. Including other variables would also boost the fit 
of the model; thus, increasing the R2. 
Overall, the empirical results have raised interesting questions for further 
exploration. The results have highlighted that Islamic banks income-smooth during 
periods of negative earnings. It is highly likely that this is linked to the profit-and-
loss sharing arrangements. Whether provisioning decisions are made separately or 
whether they are connected to profit distribution management is certainly worth 
exploring. The results also found contradictory signs on the tier 1 capital coefficient 
and are worth exploring further in order to ascertain whether or not Islamic banks 
use loan loss provisions for capital management.  
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10. Appendix 
Table 17: Central Bank of QatarÕs loan classifications and provision requirements (World 
Bank, 2000) 
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Loans that are 90-
180 days past due. 
0 
Doubtful loans 
Loans that are 180-
360 days past due. 
25 
Bad 
Loans that are over 
360 days past due. 
70 
 
Table 18: MalaysiaÕs Central Bank loan classifications (World Bank, 2000) 
Default Categories Description 
Provision level 
required (%) 
Sub-standard loans 
Loans that are 90-
180 days past due. 
20 
Doubtful loans 
Loans that are 180-
365 days past due. 
50 
Bad 
Loans that are over 
365 days past due. 
100 
 
Appendix note 1 
0.2086*0.0767=0.016 Ð standard deviation is obtained from Table 10 on page 48. 
Table 19 presents the basic GLS regression results with random individual-effects 
rather than fixed effects. The results here clearly change with tier 1 capital 
becoming significant only at the 10% significance. This could be down to the 
inconsistent and inefficient results of the random effects regression for this sample 
as depicted by the Hausman test. 
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Table 19: Basic GLS regression with random effects. Constant and year dummies included 
by not reported. 
 
  
 
Coefficient P>|z| 
EBTP/Assets -0.039 0.120 
Loan Growth -0.00001 0.406 
GDP Per Capita -0.00038 0.147 
Size -0.001 0.546 
NPL/Assets 0.004 0.945 
Tier 1 Capital/Assets -0.023* 0.071* 
R2 0.120 
Hausman test  
( Prob>chi2 value) 
0.0018*** 
